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Corporate governance and stock liquidity 
dimensions: Panel evidence from pure order-driven 
Australian market 
Abstract 
Our newly constructed index of corporate governance quality (CGQ) provides 
comprehensive and robust evidence for the association between CGQ and stock 
liquidity in the pure order-driven Australia market. By using a large sample of 1,207 
firms from 2001 to 2013, we find a significant positive relationship between CGQ and 
stock liquidity, suggesting that better governed firms have greatly improved stock 
liquidity. Specifically, we find that better governed firms have a lower trading cost, 
smaller price impacts of trade, and higher trading speed. Moreover, the empirical results 
reveal that CGQ improves stock liquidity because it is associated with higher 
information disclosure.  
Keywords: Corporate governance; stock liquidity; trading cost; price impact; 
immediacy, information disclosure 
JEL classification: G12, G34 
1 Introduction 
Stock liquidity continues to be a prominent research topic in the market microstructure 
literature, in particular since the recent global financial crisis (GFC). Handa and 
Schwartz (1996) stress that “Investors want three things from the markets: liquidity, 
liquidity and liquidity” (p. 44). Investors require compensation for holding an illiquid 
stock (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) that increases the firm’s cost of equity (Butler et 
al., 2005), and in turn affects the firm’s value (Fang et al., 2009). Given that stock 
liquidity is crucial for both investors and firms, it is vital to investigate the antecedents 
of stock liquidity.1 In particular, we aim to answer two key questions: Does corporate 
governance quality (CGQ) determine all stock liquidity dimensions? And does CGQ 
affect stock liquidity through information disclosure? 
Classical studies emphasize the role of internal CGQ in determining stock liquidity. For 
example, Coffee (1991) argues that large investors support internal governance 
mechanisms because such mechanisms enhance stock liquidity that in turn makes exit 
less costly for them. Despite such an argument, there is scant empirical evidence on the 
linkage between internal CGQ and stock liquidity. For instance, Chung et al. (2010) 
show that the CGQ improves stock liquidity in the US. These findings, however, are 
                                                 
1 A number of earlier studies identify stock and market characteristics (Benston and Hagerman, 1974; 
Branch and Freed, 1977; Tinic, 1972), and external governance environment (Bacidore and Sofianos, 
2002; Brockman and Chung, 2003; Chung, 2006; Eleswarapu and Venkataraman, 2006) as a determinant 
of stock liquidity. 
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limited to a short time-series (2001 to 2004) and coincide with the introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which might have resulted in a spurious correlation 
between CGQ and stock liquidity. Those authors use high frequency quote-based 
liquidity proxies capturing trading cost and price impact dimensions, and antitakeover 
provisions are one of the key components of their governance index.2 This casts a doubt 
on the generalizability of the results from the US to other countries, where anti-takeover 
provisions and high frequency quote-based liquidity proxies are non-existent. Other 
studies on CGQ and stock liquidity are conducted in emerging markets such as 
Malaysia (Foo and Zain, 2010), China (Lei et al., 2013), Thailand (Prommin et al., 
2014), France (Karmani and Ajina, 2012), and international markets (Chung et al., 
2012). Overall, these studies suffer from small samples and limited liquidity proxies or 
dimensions. For instance, Prommin et al. (2014) document that better governance 
improves stock liquidity over time in Thailand. However, their finding does not survive 
in the cross-sectional setting.3 Moreover, they select only 100 large firms during a short 
period of time (2006 to 2009); thus, their findings may not be generalized to the wider 
economy. 
Another important limitation of the prior studies on CGQ and stock liquidity is that 
these studies do not provide an empirical test of the channel through which CGQ affects 
stock liquidity. In theory, better CGQ increases stock liquidity by improving 
information transparency. In particular, better CGQ imposes more monitoring on 
managers and, therefore, prevents opportunistic managers from concealing and 
distorting information. Thus, better corporate governance improves the informational 
transparency of a firm and mitigates information asymmetry between insiders (e.g., 
managers) and outsiders (e.g., investors), as well as among outsiders. When information 
asymmetry is less severe, traders face fewer adverse selection problems (Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985) ; hence, they provide more liquidity to stocks of well governed firms.  
The importance of the stock liquidity and the limitations in the empirical literature 
motivate us to provide comprehensive and robust evidence on the governance–liquidity 
nexus. We take advantage of the recently available governance data of Australian firms 
through the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) database, and 
use a large sample of 1,207 non-financial Australian firms (10,179 firm-year 
observations) over the period from 2001 to 2013. We measure corporate governance by 
following the Horwath report methodology more relevant to Australian firms. The 
Horwath report places emphasis upon the quality of a firm’s internal structures and 
processes (e.g., board structure, and subcommittees).4 We measure stock liquidity by 
                                                 
2 Their governance index is based on 24 provisions; 10 of them are related to anti-takeover. 
3 Corporate governance provisions of large firms do not vary much. As can be seen in their summary 
statistics (Table 2), the governance index is 6 in the 25th percentile, 7 in the 50th percentile and 8 in the 
75th percentile. This may be the reason that they have not found significant cross-sectional variation 
between governance quality and stock liquidity. 
4This report pays special regard to the CG mechanisms that are identified as important in Australian and 
international CG best practice codes (US Blue Ribbon Committee Report 1999 [The Business Lawyer 
1999]; Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Principles of Good Governance and Best Practice 
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using three main dimensions including trading cost (i.e., time-weighted quoted spread 
[TWQS] and zero return measure [ZERO]), price impact of trade (i.e., Amihud 
illiquidity estimate [ILLIQ] and liquidity ratio [AMIVEST]), and trading frequency 
(stock turnover [STO] and turnover-adjusted number of zero daily volumes [LM]) that 
are calculated by using both high and low frequency data. To test the disclosure as a 
channel between CGQ and stock liquidity, we mainly measure information disclosure 
by counting the number of documents (total, price sensitive, and non-price sensitive) 
released by a firm at any time over the financial year.  
The pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) results reveal a significant positive linkage 
between CGQ and stock liquidity for Australian firms. Moreover, we discover that the 
improvement in stock liquidity through CGQ is related to all three dimensions of stock 
liquidity. In particular, the improvement is corporate governance helps a firm to reduce 
the trading cost and the price impact of trade, and to increase trading frequency. These 
findings are robust to the inclusion of the industry effect, the year effect, and the firm 
characteristics, such as firm size, leverage, return volatility, asset tangibility, stock 
price, firm age and growth opportunities. The findings of our study are economically 
significant as well. For example, we show that an increase in CGQ from the 25th to the 
75th percentile reduces the TWQS, ILLIQ, and LM by as much as 20.89%, 99.54%, and 
30.39% respectively. These findings are stronger than the findings of Chung et al. 
(2010) in the US (4.5%). We also document that the relationship between CGQ and 
stock liquidity is unaffected by the use of high frequency or low frequency liquidity 
proxies. Therefore, the findings of our study provide comprehensive insights into the 
governance–liquidity nexus.  
We then perform a variety of robustness checks to ensure that the main results are 
reliable. Specifically, we find that the main findings are robust to alternative estimation 
methods, such as a fixed effect (over time variation and omitted variable bias) and 
between estimators (cross-sectional variation). Further, we address the potential 
endogeneity bias by employing regressions based on one- and two-period lagged values 
of the independent variables, an instrumental variable approach i.e., two-stage least 
squares (2SLS), and a dynamic two-step system generalized method of moments 
(GMM). The results further confirm that even when the possible sources of endogeneity 
are controlled, better CGQ leads to greater stock liquidity.  
Further, we empirically show that better governance improves stock liquidity because it 
is associated with a higher level of disclosure. Specifically, we find that corporate 
governance is positively related to disclosure, and disclosure is positively related to 
stock liquidity. Moreover, we document that corporate governance does not seem to be 
associated with a statistically significant better stock liquidity for low disclosure firms. 
However, corporate governance is found to sharply increase the stock liquidity of firms 
with high disclosure. Finally, we employ three-stage least square (3SLS) method and 
                                                                                                                                               
Recommendations 2003 [ASX CG Council 2003]; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Report 2004).  
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show that governance quality is associated with improved information environment and, 
hence, improves stock liquidity. These results, therefore, suggest that to improve stock 
liquidity, firms should adopt those governance provisions that enhance a firm’s 
information environment. 
We then perform several additional analyses and show that the main findings are robust 
to individual governance categories (board, audit, nomination, and remuneration 
quality), to the inclusion of ownership concentration, and to additional information 
asymmetry variables (e.g., R&D and Big4 Audit) in the model.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, Australia possesses a distinctive 
regulatory and institutional framework that casts a doubt on the generalizability of 
results from the US to the Australian market (see e.g., Méndez et al., 2015; Monem, 
2013). For instance, Australia has a pure order-driven trading system where public limit 
orders establish bid–ask prices and provide liquidity to market participants. On the 
contrary, the US has a quote-driven market where the designated market markers quote 
the bid–ask prices and supply liquidity to the market. Brown and Zhang (1997) argue 
that the liquidity is high in markets that allow limit orders. It is, therefore, interesting to 
know whether the CGQ in the pure order-driven market of Australia can explain the 
greater liquidity. Furthermore, compared to the US, where corporate governance (CG) is 
mandatory, Australian firms are subject to a ‘comply or explain’ regime where firms are 
required to disclose a reason, if they do not comply with any governance 
recommendation. Given such a free environment, we expect a larger variation in CG 
across Australian firms that may influence stock liquidity differently. Moreover, 
Australia has a weak market for corporate control (i.e., threat of takeover), compared to 
the US, which makes the internal governance mechanisms more important for 
Australian firms to discipline poorly performing managers (Pham et al., 2011). In 
addition, Australian firms have a much higher ownership concentration than US firms 
(La Porta et al., 1998). Since ownership concentration may act as a substitute for the 
internal monitoring mechanisms, CG practices are likely to vary between Australian and 
the US firms (Monem, 2013). Given such differences, it is imperative to investigate the 
role of CGQ in determining stock liquidity for Australian firms. 
Second, although prior studies in Australia find an improvement in information 
disclosure through CGQ (Beekes and Brown, 2006; Beekes et al., 2015) and a reduction 
in information asymmetries through disclosure quality (Chang et al., 2008) , there is no 
evidence showing the linkage between CGQ and stock liquidity via disclosure. We 
extend this literature by empirically testing disclosure as a channel through which CGQ 
affects stock liquidity in Australia. In particular, we examine this channel by using three 
estimation methods: separate regressions between CGQ and disclosure, and between 
disclosure and stock liquidity; separate regressions on low disclosure and high 
disclosure firms; and the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method to eliminate the 
endogeneity problem of simultaneity bias (if any) among CGQ, disclosure and stock 
liquidity. 
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Third, prior studies on CGQ and stock liquidity include one or two dimensions of stock 
liquidity.5 We extend the literature by incorporating, in a single study, liquidity proxies 
that capture three dimensions: trading cost, price impact of trade, and immediacy. This 
helps to know if CGQ has a differential effect on various dimensions of stock liquidity. 
In addition to this, prior literature uses either high frequency quote-based or low 
frequency volume-based proxies of stock liquidity.6 We extend the literature by 
incorporating liquidity proxies that are calculated, based on both high frequency (i.e., 
time-weighted quoted spread) and low frequency data (e.g., Amihud illiquidity estimate, 
Amivest liquidity ratio and stock turnover) in a single study. The high frequency 
liquidity proxies are calculated from microstructure data on quotes and transactions that 
are not available for long time frames in most economies. However, for their 
calculations, low frequency liquidity proxies require daily volume and return data that 
are readily available in most economies for long time periods (Amihud, 2002). Hence, 
the use of low frequency liquidity proxies is important for the generalizability of the 
findings to those economies, where very little high frequency data is available.  
Fourth, prior studies on CGQ and liquidity suffer from either a small cross-section or a 
short time-series.7 However, we cover a large panel dataset that is a large cross-
sectional (1,217 unique firms) and a long time series (2001 to 2013). Investigating the 
governance–liquidity linkage in Australia in such a period is important because of two 
major events that occurred. The first, the introduction of the Australian Securities 
Exchange CG reforms (hereafter ASX CG reforms) in 2003 enabling access to data both 
pre- and post-CG reforms; the second, the GFC in 2008. The sample firms come from 
all non-financial industries, and ages, and are heterogeneous in size and profitability. 
Therefore, the extended dataset allows generalizing results to the wider economy and 
also helps to separately investigate the relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity in 
both time-series (within firm) and cross-sectional (between firms) settings.  
The remainder of our study proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews literature and 
develops hypotheses. Section 3 presents data, sample, variable descriptions, empirical 
models, estimation methods, and summary statistics. In section 4, we discuss the main 
empirical results of the relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity dimensions. In 
section 5, we investigate information disclosure as a channel through which CGQ 
affects stock liquidity. In section 6, going beyond the composite CGQ score, we 
examine the effect of governance categories on stock liquidity. In section 7, we 
investigate the ownership concentration and the impact of CGQ on stock liquidity. 
Section 8 concludes the study. 
                                                 
5 For instance, Lei et al. (2013) include only trading cost; Chung et al. (2010) include trading cost and 
price impact. However, Prommin et al. (2014) include price impact and immediacy. 
6 For example, Chung et al. (2010) and Lei et al. (2013) use high frequency proxies; Prommin et al. 
(2014) use low frequency proxies. 
7 For example, Chung et al. (2010) cover 2001 to 2004 (4 years) and 9078 observations in US; Prommin 
et al. (2014) cover 2006 to 2009 (4 years) and 400 observations in Thailand; Lei et al. (2013) cover 2006 
to 2008 (3 years) and 3923 observations in China; Foo and Zain (2010) cover 2007 (1 year) and 481 
observations. 
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2 Related literature and hypotheses development 
2.1 Corporate governance and stock liquidity 
The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation raises an 
information asymmetry problem between managers and investors: the managers have 
information that investors do not have (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Such information 
asymmetry creates a moral hazard problem where managers, at the expense of outsiders, 
have an incentive to pursue their own interests and transfer a firm’s wealth to 
themselves (Switzer and Wang, 2013). Self-interested and opportunistic managerial 
behavior can include shirking responsibility, overcompensation, consumption of 
perquisites and empire building. In order to mask their wealth expropriation, 
opportunistic managers may opt to disclose selected favourable information, resulting in 
more information asymmetry. In such cases, a governance mechanism is needed that 
can monitor managers’ opportunistic behavior and guard the rights of shareholders. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that an efficient board that is capable of better decision 
making is necessary for mitigating the information asymmetry problem. 
Corporate governance mechanisms (such as independence of the board and its 
subcommittees) are assumed to mitigate managerial incentive to distort information 
disclosure, and thus improve information transparency in a firm (Leuz et al., 2003). 
These governance mechanisms encourage self-interested managers to fully disclose 
reliable information to the market. Beekes and Brown (2006) and Beekes et al. (2015) 
empirically show that firms with better CGQ have more informative disclosure to the 
shareholders. Therefore, higher quality governance should reduce information 
asymmetry.  
Empirical studies have also documented that information asymmetries between 
management and traders is less in firms with better disclosure policies (Chang et al., 
2008; Welker, 1995). If the information asymmetry is less, it diminishes the incentive of 
traders to search for private information, leading to more homogeneous beliefs among 
traders and fewer speculative positions among informed traders (Diamond, 1985). In 
such circumstances, traders face less adverse selection costs (Glosten and Milgrom, 
1985) and therefore provide more liquidity for stocks of firms with better governance.  
Several studies have shown the empirical support of the positive relationship between 
corporate governance and stock liquidity around the globe—for instance, Chung et al. 
(2010) in the US, Foo and Zain (2010) in Malaysia, Lei et al. (2013) in China, Prommin 
et al. (2014) in Thailand, and Karmani and Ajina (2012) in France. However, these 
studies employ limited dimensions of stock liquidity and short time-series data. 
Moreover, empirical analysis on the disclosure as a channel between corporate 
governance and stock liquidity has not been shown. Finally, the findings from these 
studies may not be generalizable to the different Australian context—pure order driven 
trading system and less stringent corporate governance. Therefore, we extend the prior 
literature on corporate governance, information transparency and stock liquidity by 
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employing three main dimensions of liquidity (trading cost, price impact, and 
immediacy) with the large cross-sectional and time-series data for Australian firms.  
2.2 Corporate governance and stock liquidity dimensions 
Stock liquidity is considered a ‘slippery and elusive concept’ (Kyle, 1985: p. 1316), for 
a number of transactional properties of the market including tightness (trading cost), 
depth (price impact) and resiliency. Tightness represents the cost of turning around a 
position over a short period of time. Depth refers to the ability of the market to absorb a 
large quantity of trade without having a large price impact. Resiliency is the speed with 
which the prices return to equilibrium after a large trade.8 Black (1971) suggests another 
stock liquidity dimension, immediacy, which represents the trading speed, that is, the 
speed with which buy or sell orders can be executed. 
Prior stock liquidity research normally does not rely on one single proxy of stock 
liquidity because each proxy captures a different dimension and has its own limitations 
(Goyenko et al., 2009). However, the literature on governance quality and stock 
liquidity so far does not pay attention to the selection of the liquidity proxies/or 
dimensions as a critical part. For example, Lei et al. (2013) include only trading cost 
and Chung et al. (2010) include trading cost and price impact, measured through high 
frequency quote-based data. However, Prommin et al. (2014) include price impact and 
immediacy, calculated through low frequency volume-based data. Unlike prior 
literature, we incorporate all three key liquidity dimensions, calculated through either 
low frequency volume-based or high frequency quote-based data. This has considerable 
implications, since selecting an appropriate proxy for liquidity is an important issue in 
empirical research design (e.g., Chai et al., 2010; Goyenko et al., 2009). 
Prior research suggests a time-weighted quoted spread as a direct measure of trading 
cost. Quoted spread represents the implicit transaction cost for market orders when a 
trade occurs at a quoted price with no price improvement. The bid–ask spread widens in 
a period of increased information asymmetry because, in such circumstances, 
uninformed traders shift orders away from the market and decrease the likelihood of 
trading with informed traders. Furthermore, Lesmond et al. (1999) argue that the price 
movements are less for stocks with high trading cost than for stocks with low trading 
cost. They argue that zero-return days occur when the transaction cost threshold does 
not exceed for the marginal traders, who are either informed or uninformed. If the 
public and private information is not sufficient to exceed the transaction cost, the 
informed traders are likely to minimize their desired trades, or they may choose not to 
trade. Hence, the price will remain unchanged from the previous day. Similarly, the 
liquidity traders may choose not to trade when there is a high transaction cost. As a 
consequence, there will be no price movement from the previous day (Lesmond et al., 
1999). Building on the link between corporate governance and information asymmetry, 
                                                 
8 Chai et al. (2010) find that the return reversal effect is small in the Australian market, due to the absence 
of dealers. Therefore, we do not test this dimension of stock liquidity in this study. 
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and the link between information asymmetry and trading cost, we argue that better 
corporate governance reduces information asymmetry, which in turn reduces trading 
cost for the investors and improves stock liquidity. The hypothesis is as follows: 
H1a: All else being equal, there is a negative relationship between corporate 
governance quality and trading cost. 
Price impact of the order flow measures the absolute stock price changes with one dollar 
of trading volume. It is the premium that a buyer pays or the discount that a seller 
concedes when executing a market order that results from inventory and adverse 
selection costs. In particular, information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
traders increases the adverse selection costs and thus the price impact of trade. Bagehot 
(1971) observes that the presence of better-informed traders in the market creates a 
problem of adverse selection that may affect the process of price formation. Prior 
studies, such as Huang and Stoll (1996) on informed trading, claim that the price impact 
of trade captures information asymmetry because trade conveys private information. A 
large trade by informed traders may attract other uninformed traders and create an 
adverse selection problem. Knowing poor corporate governance increases information 
asymmetry, and the price impact of trade increases with information asymmetry, it is 
reasonable to argue that better corporate governance improves the information 
environment and thus reduces the price impact of trade. The hypothesis is as follows: 
H1b: All else being equal, there is a negative relationship between corporate 
governance quality and price impact of trade. 
Bartov and Bodnar (1996) find a relationship between information asymmetry and 
trading volume. They explain that information asymmetry may cause a reduction in the 
trading volume because uninformed traders may reduce their trades in such shares. 
Similarly, Glosten and Milgrom (1985) claim that shares with a high trading volume 
have a low level of information asymmetry, since prices reveal information. Given the 
inverse link between trading volume and information asymmetry, we posit that better 
governed firms are less likely to suffer from an information asymmetry problem, and 
thus may experience greater immediacy or trading speed. The hypothesis is as follows: 
H1c: All else being equal, there is a positive relationship between corporate 
governance and trading frequency. 
2.3 Governance categories and stock liquidity 
The proportion of independent directors is one of the key features of a board structure. 
The ASX CG Council (2003), in Principle 2.1, recommends that firms have a higher 
proportion of non-executive independent directors. From an agency perspective, it is 
argued that independent directors are more effective in monitoring and controlling the 
opportunistic behavior of management, and in reducing agency problems (Fama, 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). It is also expected that independent directors are more 
influential, due to their capital reputation and experience, as well as their ability to share 
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and provide information and ideas from outside (Kesner and Johnson, 1990). Chen and 
Jaggi (2001) find that the proportion of independent directors is positively related to 
comprehensiveness of financial disclosure. Similarly, Ajinkya et al. (2005) show that an 
independent board enhances the frequency and quality of earnings forecasts by the 
effective monitoring of management.  
CEO duality, another important aspect of a board structure, has received much attention 
from researchers and regulators. The ASX CG Council (2003) recommends that firms 
separate the roles of CEO and chair of the board (see Principle 2.3), and that an 
independent director should chair the board (see Principle 2.2). It is argued that 
chairperson independence enhances monitoring quality and thus reduces the advantages 
gained by withholding information, thereby improving the disclosure quality. Consistent 
with this argument, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find more disclosure in firms with an 
independent chairman. 
The ASX CG Council (2003) states, in Principle 2, that a firm should have a committed 
board that adequately discharges its responsibilities and duties. Since board diligence or 
commitment is not directly observable, the prior literature relies on the frequency of 
board meetings (i.e., the number of times the board meets in a year) as a proxy of board 
diligence (Kent and Stewart, 2008). With more frequent board meetings, the board is 
likely to have richer information about the firm’s operating environment. This improves 
the board’s ability to effectively exercise its monitoring role (Rutherford and Buchholtz, 
2007) in mitigating the ability and incentive of a management to distort information 
disclosure. Foo and Zain (2010) find that board independence and board meetings 
improve stock liquidity. However, these findings are limited to cross-sectional data 
only. Based on these reasoning and limited empirical findings, we develop the 
following hypothesis: 
H2a: Board quality, i.e., independent directors, independent chairman and board 
diligence, improves stock liquidity. 
The ASX CG Council (2003), in Principles 2.4, 4.2, and 9.2, recommends that firms 
establish board subcommittees: audit, nomination, and remuneration. Harrison (1987) 
argues that the specific responsibilities of these committees may assist in remedying any 
poor attendance of the directors. Upadhyay et al. (2014) show that the board committees 
improve the observability of the performance of individual directors and also reduce 
coordination and communication problems. The role of the audit committee has 
received the most attention from researchers. It is regarded as an important internal 
control mechanism that assists in the reduction of information asymmetry between 
shareholders and management (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Its interaction with external 
auditors assists the board to ensure that the financial statements represent a true and fair 
view of the firm’s financial condition (Platt and Platt, 2012). The ASX CG Council 
(2003) also recommends that the audit committee (1) should have at least three 
members, all of whom are non-executive directors and a majority of whom are 
independent directors and (2) is chaired by an independent director, who is not the chair 
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of the board. Klein (2002) argues that an audit committee composed of independent 
directors improves board effectiveness in monitoring management. Foo and Zain (2010) 
document a positive relationship between audit committee independence and stock 
liquidity. They recommend that future studies may consider other factors of corporate 
governance such as characteristics of the audit committee, remuneration and the 
existence of other committees. Overall, this evidence suggests that the existence and 
quality of board subcommittees play an effective monitoring role and are thus likely to 
improve informational efficiency and stock liquidity. Therefore, we develop the 
following hypothesis: 
H2b: The presence and quality of board subcommittees (audit, nomination, and 
remuneration) improve stock liquidity. 
3 Data and methodology 
3.1 Sample and data 
The initial sample of 13,500 firm-years consists of all the Australian listed firms whose 
CG data are available in the SIRCA during the period from 2001 to 2013. The sample 
period is important, since it includes the ASX CG reforms of 2003 and the GFC of 
2008. Consistent with the prior literature on corporate governance and stock liquidity 
(see e.g., Chung et al., 2010), we exclude financial firms because of their unique 
financial characteristics, and their operating and regulatory environment. The financial 
information about the sample firms, obtained from the Morningstar DatAnalysis 
Premium database, is complemented by the firms’ annual reports, which are available in 
Connect4. The data for the calculation of stock liquidity, such as stock price and trading 
volume, is obtained from SIRCA. The inclusion of each firm-year observation in the 
sample is conditioned on the availability of the following: (1) governance data; (2) 
financial data; and (3) liquidity data. The final sample comprises 10,179 observations 
on 1,207 non-financial firms across all size groups (small, medium, and large). To 
eliminate the undue influence of extreme values in the data, which is possibly due to 
spurious outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized to the 5th and 95th percentiles. 
3.2 Measures of corporate governance quality 
To capture the CG standing for each of the considered firms, we construct a CG index 
by following the Horwath report. Unlike the well-renowned US-based Gompers et al. 
(2003) governance index (i.e., G-index), which focuses on the resistance of firms to 
external control mechanisms, the Horwath report places emphasis on the quality of a 
firm’s internal structures and processes. This is because, compared to the US, the 
market for corporate control in Australia as a mechanism for disciplining poorly 
performing managers is not high, which makes the role of internal CG mechanisms 
more important (Pham et al., 2011). The Horwath report provides composite ratings that 
are based on six categories: (1) board structure, (2) audit committee, (3) nomination 
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committee, (4) remuneration committee, (5) external auditor independence, and (6) 
codes of conduct and other policy disclosures.9 
Multiple aspects may limit the generalizability of the findings obtained through the 
Horwath report. First, the Horwath report includes the top 250 firms each year; thus, the 
findings may not be generalizable to medium and small firms. Second, the Horwath 
report is available up to 2008; therefore, the findings do not take into consideration the 
more recent market developments, particularly after the GFC. Third, full details of the 
Horwath rating system are proprietary and confidential, so we are unable to make any 
comments on the assignment of ranking and stars beyond the information given in the 
reports. In addition, two of the six categories in the Horwath report are subjective. This 
may limit the implications of the findings for investors because they may not be able to 
replicate entire Horwath ratings. Fourth, the Horwath report does not provide the 
category score/rating, so an important question is unexplored: which governance 
category really influences stock liquidity? 
We address these issues by collecting an extended CG dataset, across both cross-section 
(small, medium, and large firms) and time-series (2001–2013), on the objective 
Horwath categories. These categories are based on 17 criteria. To construct the CG 
index, we use an equally weighted scoring methodology that has been used in extant 
corporate governance research (see e.g., Gompers et al., 2003). We assign the value 1 if 
a firm meets the particular criteria and 0 otherwise. For instance, if the majority of 
directors in a firm are independent we assign 1, and otherwise 0. These individual 
values are then aggregated to construct a composite CG index, which ranges from 0 to 
17 where 0 indicates the ‘worst’ governance and 17 indicates the ‘best’ governance. 
Each governance category (i.e., board, audit, nomination and remuneration quality) is 
the aggregate of the respective individual criteria. 
3.3 Measures of stock liquidity  
The dependent variable of our study is stock liquidity. We employ nine measures of 
stock liquidity, covering three dimensions: trading cost, price impact and immediacy.  
3.3.1 Tightness or trading cost 
Tightness or trading cost represents the cost of turning around a position over a short 
period of time. We measure tightness through time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS) 
and zero return measure (ZERO). 
3.3.1.1 Time-weighted quoted spread 
We measure TWQS as an average of the daily ratio between the time-weighted bid–ask 
spread (TWBAS) and the time-weighted mid-point price (TWMPP) in a financial year 
(Aitken and Frino, 1996; Chang et al., 2008).  
                                                 
9 Categories 1–4 are based on objective criteria and categories 5–6 are based on subjective criteria. More 
details can be found at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/horwath_cg_02.pdf.  
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TWQSit =
1
Dit
∑ TWBAS itd
TWMPP itd
Diy
d=1        (1) 
TWBAS itd =
(Ask−Bid) × Time1+(Ask−Bid) × Time2+⋯+(Ask−Bid) × Timen
Time1+ Time2+⋯+Timen
 (2) 
TWMPP itd =
(Ask+Bid)
2  × Time1+
(Ask+Bid)
2  × Time2+⋯+
(Ask+Bid)
2  × Timen
Time1+ Time2+⋯+Timen
  (3) 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the time-weighted bid–ask spread of firm i on day d of year t, 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the time-weighted mid-point price of firm i on day d of year t, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the 
number of days with available data for firm i in year t. 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 are the best 
available ask and bid prices on the limit order book; 𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 represents the time period 
that the bid–ask spread remained in existence. The higher TWQS indicates lower stock 
liquidity. 
3.3.1.2 Zero return measure  
The zero return measure (zero) is introduced by Lesmond et al. (1999). It captures the 
proportion of zero daily returns observed over the relevant year. Lesmond et al. (1999) 
show that the zero return measure is positively related to spread measures, which is 
consistent with the transaction cost effect on stock returns. It is calculated as follows: 
zeroit =  
ZRit
TDit
         (4) 
where 𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of zero return days for firm i in year t, and 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number 
of trading days for firm i in year t. The higher the ZERO, the lower the stock liquidity 
3.3.2 Price impact of trade 
Price impact or depth refers to the ability of the market to absorb a large quantity of 
trade without having a large price impact. In this study, Amihud illiquidity estimate 
(ILLIQ) and liquidity ratio (AMIVEST) are the two proxies of the price impact of trade. 
3.3.2.1 Amihud illiquidity estimate 
Given the non-availability of intraday quote data, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity estimate 
(ILLIQ), a low frequency proxy, is used to measure the daily price impact of the order 
flow. A number of empirical studies show that ILLIQ is a reliable measure of price 
impact (Hasbrouck, 2009) and stock liquidity (Goyenko et al., 2009; Karolyi et al., 
2012; Lesmond, 2005). It is measured as the daily ratio of absolute stock return to 
trading volume in Australian dollars, averaged over a number of trading days in the 
financial year, that is, how much the absolute stock price changes with one dollar of 
trading volume.  
ILLIQit =  
1
Dit
 ∑ |Ridt|
VOLDidt
Dit
d=1        (5) 
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where |𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖| is the absolute stock return of firm i on day d of year t, 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the 
trading volume of firm i on day d of year t, and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of days with available 
data for firm i in year t. The higher the ILLIQ, the lower the stock liquidity. 
3.3.2.2 Liquidity ratio 
Liquidity ratio (AMIVEST) measures the trading volume associated with a unit change 
in stock price. Also known as the Amivest measure of liquidity, it is used by several 
studies (e.g., Amihud et al., 1997; Berkman and Eleswarapu, 1998). It is based on the 
view that more liquid markets are characterized with depth, breadth, and resiliency. 
Thus, the large trades in these markets do not have a substantial effect on the share price 
(Kluger and Stephan, 1997). It is measured as the sum of daily shares traded in a 
financial year to the sum of daily absolute stock returns in a financial year. 
AMIVESTit = ∑ VOLitt /∑ |Rit|t        (6) 
where 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and |𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖| are, respectively, the daily share traded and the daily absolute 
stock returns of firm i in year t. The higher AMIVEST suggests the higher stock 
liquidity. 
3.3.3 Immediacy 
Black (1971) suggests another stock liquidity dimension, immediacy, which represents 
the trading speed, that is, the speed with which buy or sell orders can be executed. The 
stock turnover (STO), turnover-adjusted number of zero daily volumes (LM), number of 
trades (TRADES), number of levels (LEVELS), and trading volume (VOLUME) 
capture the immediacy or trading speed. 
3.3.3.1 Stock turnover  
Stock turnover (STO) captures trading frequency: how many times a share changes 
owners. Datar et al. (1998) use turnover as a proxy of stock liquidity and find a 
significant role for stock liquidity in explaining the cross-sectional variation in stock 
returns. We measure turnover as the sum of daily shares traded per year to the number 
of shares outstanding.  
STOit =  
VOLit
Nit
         (7) 
where 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the total number of shares traded for firm 𝐵𝐵 in a year 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the 
number of outstanding shares for firm 𝐵𝐵 in an year 𝑡𝑡. Volume data for each firm is 
collected on a daily basis, while outstanding shares data is collected on a yearly basis. 
The higher the STO, the higher the stock liquidity. 
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3.3.3.2 Turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes 
Liu (2006) proposes the turnover-adjusted zero daily volume (LM) as a new measure of 
stock liquidity. Although LM places a particular focus on the trading speed, it captures 
multiple dimensions of liquidity. It is measured as 
LMit = �NoZVit +  
1 (turnoverit)⁄
Deflator
�X 252
NoTDt
     (8) 
where 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑍𝑍𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the number of zero daily trading volumes for firm i in year t; 
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is the stock turnover for firm i in year t obtained from Eq. (7); 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is the 
total number of trading days in year t; and the deflator is set to 480,000, as suggested in 
Liu (2006). Multiplication by the factor 252
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
 standardizes the number of trading days 
in a year as 252 and therefore, makes LM comparable over time. The higher the LM, the 
lower the stock liquidity. 
The NoZV component of LM is an indicator of illiquidity—the higher the number of 
days with zero volume, the less frequent the trade and, therefore, the less liquid the 
stock. It reflects the trade continuity and potential delay in trade execution (Liu, 2006). 
NoZV is similar to the number of zero daily returns; therefore, LM also reflects the 
trading cost dimension of stock liquidity. The turnover component of LM captures the 
notion of how much quantity has been traded, and acts as a tiebreaker when two stocks 
have the same NoZV. Therefore, LM classifies stock as most liquid if it is traded 
frequently and has a large turnover over the relevant year.  
3.3.3.3 Other immediacy proxies  
Apart from the STO and LM, we also measure immediacy through the number of trades 
(TRADES), the number of levels (LEVELS), and the trading volume (VOLUME) 
(Chordia, Roll, et al., 2001; Chordia, Subrahmanyam, et al., 2001). TRADES is 
measured as the average number of transactions during the year. LEVELS, measured as 
the yearly average of the number of price levels available at a particular time in the 
order book, is also referred to as the depth of the order book. VOLUME is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the total number of shares traded (in dollars) during the year. 
The higher the TRADES, LEVELS and VOLUME, the higher is the stock liquidity. 
3.4 Control variables 
We include seven firm characteristics as control variables to isolate the effect of CGQ 
on stock liquidity: firm size, leverage, return volatility, asset tangibility, share price, 
firm age, and growth opportunities (Chung et al., 2010; Prommin et al., 2014). We 
control firm size because larger firms have more information available; they may attract 
much more research on their stocks and thus have less adverse selection risk (Diamond 
and Verrecchia, 1991). The proxy for firm size is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization (ln (MC)), which is calculated as the number of shares outstanding times 
share price at the end of a financial year. To accurately capture the effect of tick-size-
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induced binding constraints, instead of share price, we use the reciprocal of share price 
(1/PRICE). Return volatility (VOLATILITY) increases the uncertainty of the cost of the 
holding stock, and thus more volatile stocks have a wider bid–ask spread and more 
information asymmetry (Ho and Stoll, 1981). We measure return volatility as the 
standard deviation of daily stock returns. We also control asset tangibility 
(TANGIBILITY) because the payoffs of tangible assets are easy to observe, and this 
results in low information asymmetry. The ratio of net property, plant and equipment to 
total assets is used as a proxy of asset tangibility. In addition, we control firm age and 
leverage. Firm age (AGE) is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years 
since the firm's listing, and leverage (TLTA) is calculated as the book value of the total 
liabilities over the book value of total assets. Moreover, high growth firms may have 
more information asymmetry problem that leads to lower stock liquidity. We measure 
growth opportunities by the market to book value (MTB). Since firms in the same 
industry are relatively homogeneous (Alford, 1992), we use industry membership (IND) 
to identify firms with similar accounting methods, growth, and risk. To capture possible 
variation across industries, we include nine separate dummy variables for Consumer 
Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Health Care, Industrials, Information 
Technology, Materials, Telecommunication Services and Utilities.10 Finally, to capture 
possible variation over time, we include year effect (YR) in the model. The inclusion of 
year dummies will reduce the potential trending components shared by stock liquidity 
and corporate governance. 
3.5 Research methodology 
3.5.1 Baseline models and estimation methods 
To test H1a (i.e., better CGQ reduces trading cost), H1b (i.e., better CGQ reduces price 
impact of trade), and H1c (i.e., better CGQ improves immediacy or trading frequency), 
we formulate the following regression equation: 
𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 (𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖, 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖)
=  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽7𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  
+ 𝛿𝛿 𝑉𝑉𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + ∅ 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                                                                        (9) 
where the subscripts 𝐵𝐵 denotes individual firms (𝐵𝐵 = 1,2,…,1207), 𝑡𝑡 time period (t = 
2001 2002,…,2013), 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡 natural logarithms. α,𝛽𝛽, δ, and ∅ are parameters to be 
estimated. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 is the idiosyncratic error term. The definition and details of the variables 
in Eq. (9) are summarized in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
First, we employ pooled ordinary least squares as a baseline method on Eq. (9) to test 
the time-series and cross-sectional variation in the association between CGQ and three 
                                                 
10 We use Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). 
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dimensions of stock liquidity. The standard errors are clustered by firm to control for 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation in the residuals (Petersen, 2009). Unlike 
the study by Chung et al. (2010), we also include the year and industry effects to 
capture the variation over time and across industries, respectively.  
Second, we employ the firm fixed effect (FE) method to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, due to time-unvarying omitted variables that differ across firms but are 
constant over time. While estimating the effects of independent variables on dependent 
variables, the FE method focuses on over time changes in the variables. Since this 
method focuses particularly on the time-series variation between CGQ and stock 
liquidity, and a causal relation between them can be examined using their time-series 
covariation, FE provides an additional insight into the empirical linkage between CGQ 
and the three dimensions of stock liquidity. Third, we employ a between estimators 
(BE) method that is based on the group means of the variables, therefore capturing only 
the cross-sectional variation. 
3.5.2 Endogeneity 
One may raise concern about endogeneity between CGQ and stock liquidity. It is 
possible that CGQ and stock liquidity are endogenously determined: not only may CGQ 
affect stock liquidity, but also stock liquidity may trigger changes in CGQ 
simultaneously (Edmans et al., 2013; Li et al., 2012). This endogeneity bias is not 
addressed in the study of Chung et al. (2010); however, we use three alternative model 
specifications to address this potential endogeneity concern. The first alternative 
replaces the contemporaneous values of CGQ and the other control variables with one 
or two years lagged values. Regressions based on contemporaneous variables are 
susceptible to endogeneity bias due to reverse causality, whereas regressions based on 
lagged values of independent variables help to control for reverse causality, and thus 
tend to be less susceptible to endogeneity effects.  
The second alternative specification uses a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to 
further address the reverse causality issue. This method requires an instrumental 
variable (IV) that is strongly correlated with the endogenous variable (CGQ) but does 
not have a direct influence on the dependent variable (stock liquidity) (Kennedy, 2003, 
p. 159). Based on the literature, we consider two IVs. First, following Prommin et al. 
(2014) and Jiraporn et al. (2015), we use a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for the 
years after 2003 and 0 otherwise (the CG reform after 2003); second, following Jiraporn 
et al. (2011), Liu et al. (2014), Yang and Zhao (2014), and Liu et al. (2015), we use the 
average CGQ of all the firms in firm i’s industry (excluding firm i’s score). The use of 
CG reforms as an IV is based on the assumption that in the post reforms period (2004 to 
2013), firm-level CGQ should be higher, suggesting a strong correlation between firm-
level CGQ and CG reforms. However, the CG reform should affect stock liquidity only 
through firm CGQ. The intuition behind using industry-average CGQ as an IV is that a 
firm’s governance arrangements (such as board and its subcommittees) might be highly 
related, with the industry peers due to similar business mix and investment 
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opportunities, but such industry average is unlikely to directly affect a firm’s stock 
liquidity (Yang and Zhao, 2014).  
The third alternative specification includes a lagged liquidity into main regression and 
estimates the augmented regression using the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) dynamic two-step system GMM.11 The consistency of GMM 
estimation depends on two important conditions. The first is the serial independence of 
the residuals. The residuals in the first difference should be serially correlated (AR1) by 
way of construction but the residuals in the second difference should not be serially 
correlated (AR2). The second condition is the validity of instruments, which is tested 
through Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions. The Hansen J-statistics of 
over-identifying restrictions tests the null hypothesis of instrument validity. Compared 
to the 2SLS method, dynamic GMM has at least two benefits. First, it handles the 
endogeneity bias with internally generated instruments rather than external instruments 
or natural experiments that may not be readily available. Second, it explicitly models 
the dynamic nature of the governance–liquidity nexus by including prior year stock 
liquidity as one of the regressors. 
3.6 Description statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the CGQ, stock liquidity, and firm 
characteristics in panels A, B, and C respectively. On average, CGQ of the sample firms 
is 8.456 (minimum score 1; maximum score 17). In terms of stock liquidity proxies, the 
sample mean of TWQS is 5.362, ZERO is 40.106, ILLIQ is -0.218, AMIVEST is 2.396, 
STO is 0.478, LM is 4.077, # TRADES is 148.69, # LEVELS is 18.77 and Ln (VOL) is 
17.666. In terms of firm characteristics, the sample firms have average market 
capitalization of AUD $1,000 million. On average, the sample firms carry 35.5% debt 
(TLTA) in their capital structure. Return volatility (VOLATILITY) and asset tangibility 
(TANGIBILITY) average 0.599 and 0.220 respectively. On average, the sample firms are 
13.73 years old, with a share price (PRICE) of 8.406, and growth opportunities (MTB) 
of 2.479. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Acknowledging the unique composition of the Australian industry sectors, we present 
the sample distribution, CGQ and stock liquidity by sector using GICS in Table 3. The 
highest number of observations is from Materials (32%), followed by Industrials (16%), 
Consumer Discretionary (14%), and Energy (13%). The remaining sectors (Health Care, 
Information Technology, Consumer Staples, Telecommunication Services and Utilities) 
each contribute less than the 10% to the sample. On average, CGQ is highest in 
Consumer Staples and lowest in Utilities. The average CGQ of Consumer Staples, 
Industrials, Consumer Discretionary and Health Care is higher than the sample average. 
However, the average CGQ of Energy, Materials, and Utilities is lower than the sample 
                                                 
11Please see Roodman (2009) for the detailed estimation procedure of dynamic panel data using 
‘xtabond2’. 
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average. In terms of liquidity, different sectors perform differently. For instance, TWQS 
and ILLIQ are lowest in Consumer Staples and are highest in Information Technology, 
whereas LM is lowest in Health Care and highest in Consumer Discretionary. This 
suggests that relying on single liquidity proxy or dimension is not enough. In the last 
row, it is possible to observe the results of the Kruskal–Wallis test, which evidences 
significant differences in the variables by industry. In this sense, it is necessary to 
include industry dummies in the model.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
3.7 Correlation analysis 
Table 4 shows the Pearson correlation between the variables used in the analysis. In the 
relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity, as anticipated, CGQ has a significant 
negative correlation with TWQS, ZERO, Amihud ILLIQ, and LM, whereas CGQ has a 
statistically positive correlation with liquidity ratio (AMIVEST), stock turnover (STO), 
number of trades, number of levels and volume. These results suggest that stock 
liquidity is better in high CGQ firms. However, the correlation results here should be 
viewed with caution, because they do not control the other factors that affect stock 
liquidity. We also observe a significant correlation among alternative proxies of stock 
liquidity (TWQS and ZERO; ILLIQ and AMIVEST; STO, LM, TADES, LEVELS, and 
VOL). Additionally, CGQ is positively correlated with firm size (Ln (MC)), leverage 
(TLTA), asset tangibility (TANGIBILITY), and firm age (Ln (AGE)), indicating that 
better governed firms are larger and older, and have more asset tangibility and high debt 
in their capital structure. On the contrary, CGQ has a negative correlation with inverse 
of stock price (PRICE), stock volatility (VOLATILITY), and growth opportunities 
(MTB), implying that better governed firms are associated with lower equity risk and 
lower growth opportunities.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4 Does CGQ affect stock liquidity dimensions? 
4.1 Main results 
Table 5 presents the results of pooled OLS estimates of regression Eq. (9), when CG 
index is the proxy of CGQ and either trading cost (TWQS or ZERO), price impact 
(ILLIQ or AMIVEST), or immediacy (STO or LM) is the dimension (proxy) of stock 
liquidity.12 The regression Eq. (9) is well-fitted with an adjusted R-square of 54.7%, 
64%, 69.7%, 61%, 28.3%, and 53.5% for TWQS, ZERO, ILLIQ, AMIVEST, STO, and 
LM respectively, with statistically significant F-statistics. 
Unlike existing literature on CGQ and stock liquidity (Chung et al., 2010; Prommin et 
al., 2014), we are the first to demonstrate that the improvement in stock liquidity 
                                                 
12 We have also tested TRADES, LEVELS, and VOL as alternative liquidity measures. The results are 
similar; therefore we do not report them to save space in the tables. Results are available upon request. 
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through governance quality is not restricted to one or two dimensions, but is related to 
all three main dimensions: trading cost, price impact, and trading frequency. In addition, 
we document that the relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity is unaffected by the 
use of high frequency (TWQS) or low frequency (e.g., ILLIQ) liquidity proxies. 
Specifically, as anticipated in H1a, the coefficient on CG index is negatively significant 
at the 1% level for the proxies of trading cost in model 1 (TWQS) and model 2 (ZERO). 
This suggests that CGQ is inversely linked with the trading cost dimension of stock 
liquidity. As predicted in H1b, the coefficient on CG index is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in model 3 (ILLIQ), and is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in model 4 (AMIVEST). These results indicate that CGQ is 
inversely related to the price impact dimension of the stock liquidity. As expected in 
H1c, the CG index has a strong positive influence on the STO (model 5) and a strong 
negative influence on the LM (model 6). These findings show that CGQ can improve 
the immediacy dimension of stock liquidity. Overall, these results support the notion 
that better CGQ improves three dimensions of stock liquidity. Therefore, we accept 
H1a, H1b, and H1c. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The study gauges the economic significance of the results by calculating the marginal 
effect of an increase in the CG index from the 25th to the 75th percentile, corresponding 
to an increase in the CGQ from 5 to 12. Multiplying the change in CG index (7 points) 
by the coefficient on CG index (0.160 in the model 1) gives a change in TWQS (trading 
cost) of approximately -20.89% of the mean TWQS. Similarly, ILLIQ (price impact) 
and LM (immediacy) change by -99.54% and -30.39% in response to an increase in CG 
index by 7 points. Hence, these findings indicate that the trading cost and price impact 
could be decreased by 20.89% and 99.54% respectively, and immediacy could be 
increased by 30.39%, with an introduction of governance mechanisms that improves the 
CG index from the 25th to the 75th percentile. Compared to the findings of Chung et al. 
(2010) in the US (4.5%), the results are more economically significant in the less strict 
CG environment and pure order-driven trading system of Australia.  
To investigate the within variation and to control omitted variable bias, we apply the FE 
method and present the results in panel A of Table 6. The regression model is well-
fitted, with a reasonable adjusted R-square and statistically significant F-statistics. We 
again find that trading cost (TWQS and ZERO) and price impact (ILLIQ and 
AMIVEST) are negatively and significantly related to CGQ, while trading frequency 
(STO and LM) is positively and significantly related to CGQ. These results further 
support that better CGQ improves stock liquidity, even when the firm fixed effect is 
controlled. The existing literature on CGQ and stock liquidity (Chung et al., 2010; 
Prommin et al., 2014) shows fixed-effect regression in the short time-series (n=4). 
However, FE may not be suitable for a relatively short time-series (Baltagi, 2008). The 
FE estimates, based on a relatively long time-series (n=13), provide additional support 
to the governance–liquidity linkage. 
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
To gain further insight, we separately investigate the cross-sectional variation through 
the BE regressions. The results (see panel B, Table 6), which confirm that the CGQ is 
also linked to stock liquidity cross-sectionally, contrast with those of Prommin et al. 
(2014), who do not find significant linkage between CGQ and stock liquidity in a cross-
sectional setting. We argue that in their sample, based on 100 large Thai firms, most of 
the large firms may have similar CG and similar firm characteristics and thus may not 
produce cross-sectional variation in stock liquidity. The BE estimates, with a relatively 
large cross-section (i=1,207 firms), provide additional support to the governance–
liquidity linkage. 
4.2 Endogeneity 
Table 7 reports the estimated results of Eq. (9), including the CGQ and control variables 
of year t-1 (panel A) and year t-2 (panel B) and the stock liquidity of year t. The new 
estimated results are qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 5. The regression 
Equation 9 with one year lagged independent variables is well-fitted, with an adjusted 
R-square of 54.30%, 61.80%, 69.70%, 61.50%, 26.10%, and 50.40% for TWQS, 
ZERO, ILLIQ, AMIVEST, STO, and LM respectively, with statistically significant F-
statistics. CGQ is significantly and negatively related to trading cost and price impact, 
and significantly and positively related to trading frequency at lag 1 and lag 2 
specifications.13 This suggests that CGQ has a power to predict stock liquidity. From 
these results, we conclude that the prior CGQ choices of a firm effect current stock 
liquidity instead of prior stock liquidity effecting current CGQ. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
We report the 2SLS results in Table 8 based on two IVs (CG reform and Industry 
CGQ). The first-stage regression (model 1) result reveals that the coefficient on 
industry-average CGQ and CG reforms are positively and statistically significant. This 
implies that both these IVs are not weak because of their statistical power to explain 
firm-level CGQ. In the second-stage regressions (models 2–7), either trading cost 
(TWQS or ZERO), price impact (ILLIQ or AMIVEST) or immediacy (STO or LM) is 
the dependent variable. The coefficient on the fitted CGQ is statistically significant and 
confirms the earlier findings that better CGQ improves stock liquidity.14 We conclude 
that the results are robust to the use of the 2SLS approach.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
To further address the endogeneity issue, we apply the two-step system GMM by 
including past stock liquidity in the main regression. The results are reported in Table 9. 
The diagnostics tests show that models 1–6 are well-fitted with statistically insignificant 
                                                 
13 Taking the lag values of only the CG index produces similar results and is not reported, for brevity. 
14 The 2SLS results remain unaffected when we use alternative methods, such as, information maximum 
likelihood and generalized method of moments. 
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test statistics for second-order autocorrelation in second differences (AR2) and for 
Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions. The interpretation of the coefficients 
on the CG index parallels that in Table 5. For instance, the statistically significant 
negative coefficients on the CG index for TWQS, ZERO, ILLIQ and LM suggest that 
better governance is related to greater stock liquidity. Likewise, the statistically 
significant positive coefficients on the CG index for AMIVEST and STO suggest that 
governance quality positively relates to stock liquidity. Overall, the system GMM 
estimates support the notion that even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity, better governance is associated with all the 
dimensions of stock liquidity in a way that is consistent with the expectation.15 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Although it is difficult to completely eliminate endogeneity, the various analyses based 
on lagged independent variables, the 2SLS approach, and the dynamic system GMM 
should provide a certain degree of comfort that the relationship between CGQ and stock 
liquidity dimensions is not endogenously determined. 
5 Does CGQ affect stock liquidity dimensions through information 
disclosure? 
In this section, we explore a specific channel through which CGQ can improve stock 
liquidity dimensions. Since we argue in section 2 that CGQ could improve stock 
liquidity by improving firm disclosure, we examine whether (1) CGQ is associated with 
a higher disclosure (Eq. 10), and (2) a higher level of disclosure improves stock 
liquidity (Eq. 11). 
𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 (𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖, 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖)
=  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽7𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  
+ 𝛿𝛿 𝑉𝑉𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + ∅ 𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                                                                          (10) 
𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖, 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖�
=  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽4 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  
+  𝛽𝛽7𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  + 𝛿𝛿 𝑉𝑉𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + ∅ 𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                  (11) 
We use document count as a proxy of disclosure level. We count the number of 
documents released by a firm at any time over the financial year. We count each 
disclosure document released by a firm, regardless of whether another document was 
also released on the same day. The document count is the natural logarithm of the total 
of all documents (TD), or those classified by the ASX as price sensitive (PS) or as non-
price sensitive (NPS). Although such a measure has a limitation that it does not include 
                                                 
15 We find similar results (unreported) when we include the two external IVs (CG reforms and Industry 
CGQ) with the internal IVs in the GMM. 
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intermediate sources such as analyst reports16 or press items, its advantage is that it 
captures the information emanating from the firm itself, directed to the stock market 
(Beekes and Brown, 2006; Beekes et al., 2015). 
The descriptive statistics (untabulated) indicate that, on average, sample firms released 
48 total documents, 13 price sensitive documents, and 35 non-price sensitive documents 
per year during the 13 years. The correlation analysis (untabulated) provides a strong 
positive bi-variate relationship between CGQ and disclosure, and between disclosure 
and stock liquidity. Table 10 reports the multivariate results between CGQ and 
disclosure in panel A, and between disclosure and stock liquidity dimensions in panel B. 
To mitigate unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate these relationships by using firm 
fixed effect regressions. As shown in panel A and panel B of Table 10, after controlling 
firm characteristics and year effects, we find that CGQ is positively related to disclosure 
(TD, PS, and NPS), and disclosure is positively related to stock liquidity dimensions 
(trading cost, price impact and immediacy). Overall, these results indicate that 
governance quality is associated with an improved information environment and, hence, 
reduces stock liquidity risk. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Furthermore, we use a split sample strategy to check if CGQ has a stronger effect on 
stock liquidity for the firms that disclose more information. We split the sample into 
firms with high disclosure and firms with low disclosure using TD. We classify a firm 
in a low disclosure category if TD is in the 25th percentile (Q1) and in a high disclosure 
category if TD is in the 75th percentile (Q4). Table 11 presents the fixed effect 
regression results. For low disclosure firms, CGQ does not seem to be associated with a 
statistically significant better stock liquidity. On the other hand, CGQ is found to 
sharply increase the stock liquidity of firms with high disclosure. These findings are 
robust to alternative dimensions of stock liquidity. We also use alternative proxies of 
disclosure (PS and NPS), and alternative classification method (sample median). The 
results (untabulated) are similar to those reported in Table 11. Thus, we confirm that 
CGQ improves stock liquidity through an improved information environment of a firm. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
Finally, a stream of literature (e.g., Edmans et al., 2013) provides evidence on the 
reverse effect of stock liquidity on governance. Although such literature measures 
governance through ownership variables (blockholders) that differ from our governance 
proxy (board and subcommittees), we use the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method 
to eliminate the endogeneity problem from simultaneity bias (if any) among CGQ, 
disclosure and stock liquidity. We endogenize CGQ and disclosure, given existing 
literature (Beekes et al., 2015; Haß et al., 2014; Monem, 2013) on their determinants, 
                                                 
16 Some studies consider analyst coverage as a monitoring mechanism to scrutinize managerial behavior 
in distorting information. These studies show that stock illiquidity increases with an exogenous loss of 
analyst coverage (see e.g., Chen et al., 2015). 
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by developing two regression equations, Eq. (12) and  Eq. (13), for CGQ and disclosure, 
respectively: 
𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 �𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖�
=  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑍𝑍𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽4 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽7𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽8𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽8𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + ∅ 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                         (12) 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑍𝑍𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽7𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)2𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
+  𝛽𝛽8𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇20𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑍𝑍𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  + ∅ 𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                 (13) 
The definition of variables (except for ROA, LOSS, IFRS, TOP20 and REFORM) 
remains the same as summarized in Table 1. ROA is the net income over total assets; 
LOSS is a dummy variable for the year in which net income is negative; International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is equal to 1 for the year 2006 and afterwards, 
and 0 otherwise; TOP20 is the percentage of outstanding shares held by top twenty 
shareholders; REFORM is equal to 1 for the year 2004 and afterwards, and 0 otherwise. 
The three equations, Eq. (9) with the inclusion of disclosure, Eq. (12) and Eq. (13), are 
solved as a system of simultaneous equations using the 3SLS method; results are 
reported in Table 12. We do not report the control variables for brevity. Panel A of 
Table 12 shows the effect of CGQ on stock liquidity. Even with direct control of 
endogeneity with 3SLS, the findings remain the same i.e., better CGQ improves stock 
liquidity dimensions (trading cost, price impact, and immediacy). 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
6 Robustness checks: Does CGQ affect stock liquidity dimensions? 
6.1 Governance categories  
The empirical evidence so far demonstrates a robust positive association between CGQ 
and stock liquidity dimensions. The CG index is based on four governance categories: 
(1) board structure, (2) audit committee, (3) remuneration committee, and (4) 
nomination committee. In this section, we aim to understand which specific CGQ 
categories drive the results. Since some of the CGQ categories are correlated, we run 
separate regressions for each category to avoid multicollinearity problems. The fixed 
effect regression results, reported in Table 13, show that all the governance categories 
are significantly related to the three dimensions of stock liquidity. However, the large 
coefficient on board quality than on those of the other three categories should be noted. 
This is consistent with the notion that board quality (proportion of independent 
directors, CEO duality, and board meetings) is directly related to management control, 
thus preventing them from distorting information. Overall, the evidence suggests the 
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relationship between CGQ and stock liquidity is not driven by a few governance 
categories. Therefore, we accept H2a and 2b.  
[Insert Table 13 here] 
In addition to the governance categories, we also investigate the relationship between 
individual governance variables and stock liquidity. To do so, we first omit the highly 
correlated variables from each governance category and we run separate fixed-effect 
regressions for the individual variables of board, audit, remuneration, and nomination. 
The results are reported in Table 14. We find that two of the board quality variables 
(proportion of independent directors; number of board meetings) significantly reduce 
liquidity risk. Further to this, the presence and quality (independence, size, and 
meetings) of an audit committee significantly increase stock liquidity. The presence and 
quality (independence) of nomination and remunerations committee also improve stock 
liquidity. Although we find significant relations between individual governance 
variables and stock liquidity, such a relationship seems a little sensitive to the choice of 
liquidity proxies.  
[Insert Table 14 here] 
6.2 Ownership structure  
We further check the robustness of the results by including ownership concentration in 
the model. A number of prior empirical studies show that the concentrated ownership 
structure plays an important role in shaping stock liquidity. Theoretically, (see e.g., 
Bolton and Thadden, 1998; Maug, 1998), concentrated ownership may influence stock 
liquidity through two key mechanisms: the informed-trading effect and the trading-
activity effect. The informed-trading effect indicates that since large shareholders have 
an incentive to monitor the operations of the firms, they have access to private, value-
relevant information and they may trade on this information to extract private benefits, 
thus increasing adverse selection costs and reducing stock liquidity (Heflin and Shaw, 
2000).The trading-activity effect argues that high ownership concentration is inversely 
related to trading volume and continuity of order flow because large shareholders trade 
with lower frequency, leading to wider spreads and lower depth (Kothare, 1997). Both 
these effects suggest the inverse relationship of ownership concentration with stock 
liquidity (Chu et al., 2015).  
Further to this, ownership concentration may be related to internal governance practices. 
Since ownership concentration permits close monitoring of a firm’s management, it 
may reduce the demand for alternative monitoring mechanisms (e.g., proportion of 
independent directors and separation of CEO from board chair). Consistent with this 
argument, Monem (2013) finds that high ownership concentration decreases board 
independence and increases CEO duality. Given these evidences, it is interesting to 
include ownership concentration variables in the model and examine if the CGQ and 
stock liquidity survives in the presence of ownership concentration. 
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We consider four ownership concentration variables; namely, the percentage of shares 
held by the top twenty shareholders (Top 20), by substantial shareholders (block), and 
by the chief executive officer (CEO), as well as the presence of directors with 
substantial shareholdings (Directors). We collect this data from SIRCA. Based on these 
four variables, we construct an ownership concentration index (OC index). We assign 1 
if the Top 20, block and CEO shareholdings are higher than the sample median and 0 
otherwise and assigns 1 if one or more of the directors is the substantial shareholders of 
the firm and 0 otherwise. The OC index ranges from 0 to 4, where 0 indicating the 
lowest concentration and 4 the highest concentration.  
Table 15 presents the results between CGQ, ownership concentration and stock 
liquidity. As expected and shown in Table 15, the OC index has a significant negative 
influence on stock liquidity. Specifically, we find that high ownership concentration is 
associated with higher trading cost, higher price impact of trade, and low trading 
frequency. Importantly, the coefficients on CGQ remain significant even after 
controlling for ownership concentration. This again confirms the robustness of the 
results on the relationships between CGQ and the three dimensions of stock liquidity. 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
6.3 Information asymmetry 
Since information asymmetry is an important factor that affects stock liquidity, we 
further check the robustness of our main results by including three additional variables 
to capture the extent of information asymmetry. First, we look into the quality of the 
firm's auditor (Jiang et al., 2017). Good auditors reduce both intentional and 
unintentional measurement errors in historical earnings, leading to transparent financial 
statements (e.g., Becker et al., 1998), and thus decrease information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders. Second, we focus on the R&D intensity to capture the level of 
information asymmetry in a firm (Cai et al., 2015). Prior literature suggests that insider 
trading gains are substantially greater in R&D intensive firms than non-R&D intensive 
firms; therefore, R&D is considered a major factor in increasing information asymmetry 
(Aboody and Lev, 2000). Moreover, high R&D intensity may increase asymmetric 
information problems because it is difficult to observe the payoffs from R&D (Chung et 
al., 2010). Finally, we employ CEO shareholdings to gauge the degree of information 
asymmetry. Managers (i.e., CEO) constitute a subgroup of informed traders for three 
reasons: 1) They naturally have access to insider information, 2) they own a 
considerable amount of shares in the company, and 3) they trade in their own firms' 
stocks (Bharath et al., 2009). Furthermore, it is argued that CEOs who own greater 
proportions of the firm’s stock are more powerful, and powerful CEOs lack opinion 
diversification and compromise less with other executives of the firms. Consequently, 
powerful CEOs are likely to be associated with information asymmetry (Adams et al., 
2005) and poor stock liquidity.  
Empirically, we use Big4, R&D, and CEOSh to proxy for information asymmetry. Big4 
is a dummy variable that takes a value ‘1’ if a firm is audited by a Big 4 Audit firm and 
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‘0’ otherwise. The data on Big4 is obtained from SIRCA.17 R&D is a ratio of R&D 
expenditure divided by annual sales. The frequency of missing observations is high for 
the R&D expenditure because many firms do not report R&D expenditure. To 
maximize data utilization, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Chung et al., 2010), we 
assume that a firm has zero R&D expenditure if its R&D expenditure is not reported in 
the OSIRIS database. CEOSh is a percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares held by 
the CEO. The data on CEOSh is obtained from SIRCA. We include these factors in our 
baseline regression Eq. (9). 
Table 16 presents the firm fixed effect regression results. We find that CGQ is 
negatively and significantly linked to trading cost (TWQS and ZERO) and price impact 
(ILLIQ and AMIVEST), while CGQ is positively and significantly associated to trading 
frequency (STO and LM). These results confirm that even when the additional variables 
related to information asymmetry are controlled, CGQ has a strong positive impact all 
stock liquidity dimensions. 
[Insert Table 16 here] 
7 Robustness analyses: Does CGQ affect stock liquidity dimensions 
through information disclosure? 
7.1 Subgroup analysis based on information asymmetry 
To strengthen the subsample analysis as reported in Table 11, we explore whether the 
CGQ effect on stock liquidity is different among high information asymmetry firms 
over those with low information asymmetry. We classify a firm into low information 
asymmetry group based on Big4, R&D, and CEOSh. Specifically, we consider a firm in 
a low information asymmetry category, if a firm avails the auditing service from Big4 
audit firm; a firm has zero R&D expenditure, and a firm has low CEO shareholdings 
(25th percentile). Table 17 presents the fixed effect regression results in panel A for 
BIG4, in panel B for R&D, and in panel C for CEOSh. For brevity, we report results for 
only three liquidity proxies (TWQS, ILLIQ, and LM). A lower value of these liquidity 
proxies indicates greater stock liquidity. Our results indicate that the positive effect of 
CGQ on stock liquidity dimensions is much stronger and significant for the firms with 
low information asymmetry (Columns 1, 3, and 5). On the contrary, we find less 
significantly positive impact of CGQ on stock liquidity for the firms with high 
information asymmetry (Columns 2, 4, and 6). From these results, we infer that if the 
firm wants to improve stock liquidity then it should adopt the governance provisions 
that alleviate the information asymmetry problems. 
 [Insert Table 17 here] 
                                                 
17 We have also used the available observations of analyst coverage from the Bloomberg and results are 
robust. 
28 
 
7.2 Alternative proxy for information disclosure  
In section 5, we find that information disclosure is a channel through which CGQ 
affects stock liquidity. To make this result more robust, instead of using document 
count, we employ an alternative proxy for information disclosure – timeliness of price 
discovery (Beekes and Brown, 2006; Beekes et al., 2015). This measure has its origins 
in the seminal work of Ball and Brown (1968) who stated that annual financial 
statements are not a timely source of earnings-related information because most of the 
value-relevant component of earnings (85% to 90%) has already been captured by 
timelier media. This metric captures how accurately a firm’s share price (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖), observed 
at daily intervals from day-250 until day-1, approximates its terminal value (𝑇𝑇0), which 
is the share price 10 days after the release of a firm’s preliminary financial statement 
(PFS). Specifically, we measure timeliness of price discovery as: 
𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 =
��∑ | ln(𝑃𝑃0)−ln(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡)|𝑡𝑡=−1𝑡𝑡=−250 �−0.5�
250
                                                           (14)   
where 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is daily market-adjusted share price, 𝑇𝑇0 is the price 10 days after the PFS 
announcement date, and the constant -0.5/250 is an adjustment made to recognize the 
flow of information that is reflected in returns over the trading day.  
Timeliness metric captures how much value relevant information is already known from 
other sources prior to the PFS announcement. If a firm releases value relevant 
information on a timely basis, the information is incorporated into share price quickly, 
and then the metric will have a value closer to zero. Therefore, the smaller it takes a 
firm’s share price to converge to its terminal price, the smaller the value of 
TIMELINESS.  
Table 18 reports the results between CGQ and timeliness in panel A and between 
timeliness and stock liquidity dimensions in panel B. The results indicate that CGQ is 
significantly and negatively associated with timeliness, suggesting that value relevant 
information is priced rapidly when the firm has better governance quality. Furthermore, 
we document that timeliness is significantly and positively associated with stock 
illiquidity, implying that the longer it takes to incorporate value relevant information, 
the poorer is the stock liquidity. Overall, these results indicate that governance quality 
improves stock liquidity because it is associated with an efficient information 
environment of a firm. 
[Insert Table 18 here] 
8 Conclusion 
We contribute to the literature by providing comprehensive and updated evidence on the 
linkage between governance quality and stock liquidity. Compared to the more stringent 
governance and quote-driven market of the US (Chung et al., 2010), we provide new 
evidence on the linkage between CGQ and stock liquidity in the less stringent 
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governance and pure order-driven market of Australia. In contrast to Chung et al. 
(2010), we construct a CG index that is based purely on internal governance quality and 
is more relevant to Australian firms, and uses stock liquidity proxies that cover all three 
dimensions of liquidity: trading cost (time-weighted quoted spread and zero return 
measure), price impact of trade (Amihud illiquidity estimate and liquidity ratio), and 
immediacy (stock turnover and turnover adjusted zero volume days). These proxies are 
calculated by using high and low frequency quote-, volume- and price-based data. In 
addition, unlike Chung et al. (2010), we cope with reverse causality by using lagged 
variables, 2SLS and dynamic system GMM.  
Based on these improvements in methodology, we find a stronger positive influence of 
CGQ on all stock liquidity dimensions in Australia over the period from 2001 to 2013. 
Specifically, the results indicate that firms can reduce trading cost and price impact of 
trade, and can increase trading frequency, with an improvement in corporate 
governance. These findings are robust to different proxies of stock liquidity dimensions, 
to alternative estimation methods (pooled OLS, FE, and BE), to endogeneity bias, to 
governance categories (board, audit, nomination, and remuneration), to the ownership 
concentration and information asymmetry variables. 
Explicitly, these findings look similar to the findings of Chung et al. (2010); however, 
we provide several new insights. First, compared to the US results, the Australian 
results have a stronger economic significance. These findings indicate that Australian 
firms can reduce the quoted spread by 20.89% (4.5% in the US) with an increase in 
governance quality from 25th to 75th percentiles. Second, these results are generalizable 
to markets where high frequency liquidity data and anti-takeover provisions are not 
readily available. Finally, we are the first to empirically show that better governance 
improves stock liquidity because it is associated with a higher level of disclosure both in 
terms of document counts and timeliness of price discovery. 
The overall findings suggest that governance quality is an important determinant of 
stock liquidity. Given such findings, one of the important practical implications of these 
results is that investors and firms may wish to monitor governance mechanisms more 
closely in order to devise sound trading strategies and corporate governance structure, 
respectively. From a regulatory perspective, as corporate governance improves stock 
liquidity through information disclosure, this gives empirical support to the regulators to 
simultaneously design appropriate governance recommendations, disclosure policies 
and trading regulations. 
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Table 1: Definition of variables 
Notations Variable names Measures 
Panel A: Dependent variables (Stock liquidity) 
Trading cost measures (tightness) 
TWQS Time-weighted 
quoted spread 
Daily ratio of time-weighted bid–ask spread divided by time-
weighted mid-point spread averaged over a number of trading 
days in the financial year 
ZERO Zero return 
measure 
Proportion of zero daily returns over a number of trading days 
in the financial year 
Price impact measures (depth) 
ILLIQ Amihud illiquidity 
estimate 
Daily ratio of absolute stock return to trading volume in 
Australian dollars averaged over a number of trading days in 
the financial year 
AMIVEST Liquidity ratio Sum of daily trading volume to the sum of absolute stock return 
in a financial year 
Trading frequency measures (immediacy) 
STO Stock turnover Sum of daily shares traded to the number of shares outstanding 
in the financial year 
LM Turnover-adjusted 
zero daily volumes 
Turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes 
TRADES Number of trades Average of number of transactions during the year 
LEVELS Number of levels Average of number of levels during the year 
VOLUME Trading volume Total number of shares traded during the year 
Panel B: Main independent variable (Corporate governance quality)  
CG index Corporate 
governance index 
Self-constructed corporate governance index based on 17 
objective criteria of the Horwath report 
Governance 
categories 
  
Board  Board quality 
index  
Board quality is a self-constructed board quality index based on 
respective criteria, which ranges from 0 to 3 
Audit  Audit quality index Audit quality is a self-constructed audit quality index based on 
respective criteria, which ranges from 0 to 6 
Nomination  Nomination quality 
index 
Nomination quality is a self-constructed governance category 
based on respective criteria, which ranges from 0 to 4 
Remuneratio
n  
Remuneration 
quality index 
Remuneration quality is a self-constructed governance category 
based on respective criteria, which ranges from 0 to 4 
Panel C: Control variables (Firm characteristics) 
MC Firm size Number of shares outstanding times share price at the end of 
fiscal year 
TLTA Leverage Book value of total liabilities over book value of total assets 
VOLATILITY Return volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns 
TANGIBILITY Asset tangibility Net property, plant and equipment to total assets 
PRICE Stock price Reciprocal or inverse of stock price 
AGE Firm age Number of year firm is listed on the ASX at the end of each 
fiscal year 
MTB Growth 
opportunities 
Market value to book value ratio 
Panel D: Fixed effects 
YR Year effect Thirteen individual dummy variables which equals either ‘1’ or 
‘0’ for each year from 2001 to 2013 with 2001 being the 
excluded year 
IND Industry effect Nine individual dummy variables which equals either ‘1’ or ‘0’ 
for each industry from Consumer Staples, Health Care, 
Information Technology, Industrials, Materials, Consumer 
Discretionary, Energy, Utility, Telecommunication Services 
with Telecommunication Services being excluded. The industry 
classification is based on Standard & Poor’s two-digit Global 
Industry Classification Scheme (GICS) 
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Table 5: CGQ and stock liquidity: Pooled ordinary least squares (H1a, 1b, 1c) 
 
Trading cost 
 
Price impact 
 
Immediacy 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
 
Model 5 Model 6 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dep. 
variables TWQS ZERO 
 
ILLIQ AMIVEST 
 
STO LM 
 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
Corporate governance quality 
CG index -0.162*** -0.790*** 
 
-0.031*** 0.015*** 
 
0.008*** -0.177*** 
 
(-7.90) (-8.06) 
 
(-3.44) (2.62) 
 
(4.19) (-7.99) 
Firm characteristics 
Ln (MC) -2.052*** -12.072*** 
 
-1.082*** 1.012*** 
 
0.115*** -2.456*** 
 
(-21.09) (-29.07) 
 
(-23.74) (39.75) 
 
(13.25) (-25.08) 
TLTA 2.554*** 4.666*** 
 
-0.291** 0.035 
 
0.024 1.559*** 
 
(6.25) (2.74) 
 
(-2.00) (0.39) 
 
(0.73) (3.76) 
VOLATILIT
Y -4.094*** -36.332*** 
 
1.855*** -0.124 
 
0.622*** -8.798*** 
 
(-9.75) (-24.90) 
 
(13.33) (-1.41) 
 
(20.89) (-23.50) 
TANGIBILI
TY 0.104 6.051*** 
 
0.086 -0.143 
 
-0.045 1.199*** 
 
(0.27) (3.28) 
 
(0.48) (-1.48) 
 
(-1.27) (2.78) 
PRICE -0.278*** -0.374 
 
0.073* -0.807*** 
 
-0.014 0.367*** 
 
(-2.87) (-0.84) 
 
(1.73) (-29.98) 
 
(-1.59) (3.65) 
Ln (AGE) 0.363*** 1.899*** 
 
-0.059 0.064*** 
 
0.030*** 0.435*** 
 
(4.19) (4.57) 
 
(-1.55) (2.65) 
 
(3.66) (4.75) 
MTB 0.138*** 0.357** 
 
0.035*** -0.000 
 
-0.002 0.086*** 
 
(4.37) (2.57) 
 
(2.62) (-0.02) 
 
(-0.65) (2.78) 
Industry 
effect  Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Year effect  Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Intercept 41.570*** 269.327*** 
 
19.443*** -17.357*** 
 
-2.324*** 50.222*** 
 
(24.48) (36.91) 
 
(22.14) (-37.92) 
 
(-15.17) (29.49) 
Model fits: 
        Adj. R2 0.547 0.640 
 
0.697 0.610 
 
0.283 0.535 
F-statistics 110.96*** 247.91***  193.49*** 167.93***  51.15*** 106.71*** N 10179 10179 
 
10179 10179 
 
10179 10179 
No. of firms 1207 1207 
 
1207 1207 
 
1207 1207 
This table presents the results of pooled ordinary least square estimates of Eq. (9). 
 
SLQi,t (Trading costi,t, Price impacti,tImmediacyi,t)
=  𝛼𝛼0 + β1CGQi,t + β2Ln(MC)i,t + β3TLTAi,t + β4 VOLATILITYi,t + β5TANGIBILITYi,t + β6 ln(PRICE)i,t  +  β7Ln(AGE)i,t
+ β8MTBi,t  + δ YRt + ∅ INDi + εi,t                                                                                                                                                         (9) 
 
Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period, ln natural logarithm. The dependent variable, SLQ, is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in 
Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 3) or liquidity ratio (AMIVEST in 
Model 4) or trading turnover (STO in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Model 6). CG index is self-constructed index based on 
17 objective criteria of the Horwath report; Ln (MC) is the natural log of market capitalization; TLTA is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets; VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of daily stock returns; TANGIBILITY is net property, plant and equipment to total assets; PRICE is the 
reciprocal or natural log of stock price; Ln (AGE) is the natural log of number of years since the firm had been listed on the ASX by the end of its 
financial year. YR is a year dummy. IND is an industry dummy. α, β, δ, and ∅ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 8: CGQ and stock liquidity: Instrumental variable approach (H1a, 1b, 1c) 
 First stage  Second stage 
   Trading cost Price impact Immediacy 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Dep. variables (t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) 
 CG index  TWQS ZERO ILLIQ AMIVEST STO LM 
Corporate governance quality 
CG reforms 1.844***        
 22.39        
Industry CGQ 0.618***        
 (20.38)        
         
Fitted CGQ   -0.221*** -0.493*** -0.049*** 0.030*** 0.002 -0.123*** 
   (-5.41) (-2.87) (3.11) (2.82) (0.41) (-3.08)  
Firm characteristics 
Ln (MC) 1.257***  -1.834*** -12.290*** -1.189*** 0.645*** 0.121*** -2.171*** 
 (51.94)  (-29.87) (-47.71) (-50.18) (39.75) (21.12) (-36.35)  
TLTA 2.180***  2.434*** 5.880*** -0.174* -0.446*** -0.072*** 1.616*** 
 (13.19)  (10.56) (6.08) (-1.95) (-7.31) (-3.36) (7.21) 
VOLATILITY 0.274*  -2.872*** -33.965*** 1.785*** 0.727*** 0.591*** -8.429*** 
 (1.85)  (-16.25) (-45.83) (26.19) (15.58) (36.01) (-49.06)  
TANGIBILITY 0.251  0.173 5.412*** -0.095 0.023 -0.009 1.106*** 
 (1.48)  (0.84) (6.27) (-1.20) (0.43) (-0.49) (5.53) 
PRICE -0.009***  0.058*** 0.041** -0.014*** 0.054*** 0.002*** 0.000 
 (-2.67)  (14.39) (2.44) (-8.69) (50.28) (5.86) (0.10) 
Ln (AGE) -0.188***  0.348*** 2.172*** -0.032* 0.050*** 0.033*** 0.517*** 
 (-4.96)  (7.48) (11.13) (-1.80) (4.06) (7.67) (11.43) 
MTB -0.331***  0.041* 0.185* 0.060*** -0.037*** -0.000 0.058**  
 (-21.39)  (1.75) (1.88) (6.65) (-5.98) (-0.20) (2.56) 
Industry effect (IND) No  No No No No No No 
Year effect No  No No No No No No 
Intercept   39.906*** 278.277*** 19.959*** -10.304*** -2.140*** 47.348*** 
 (-37.29 )  (48.01) (79.82) (62.24) (-46.91) (-27.70) (58.59) 
Model fits:         
Adj. R2 0.451  0.511 0.619 0.684 0.466 0.237 0.619 
F-statistics 929.98***  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
N 10179  10179 10179 10179 10179 10179 10179 
No. of firms 1207  1207 1207 1207 1207 1207 1207 
This table presents the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS). The dependent variable in first-stage is CGQ which is self-constructed governance 
index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report; CG reforms is a dummy variable that take the value 1 if year is from 2004 to 2013, 
otherwise 0; Industry-average CGQ is measured as (industry CGQ minus firm-level CGQ) divided by (total observations in an industry minus one). 
The dependent variable in second-stage is stock liquidity which is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 2) or proportion of zero 
return days (ZERO in Model 3) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 4) or liquidity ratio (AMIVEST in Model 5) or trading turnover 
(STO in Model 6) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Model 7). See Table 1 for the definition of variables. Figures in parenthesis are the 
t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 9: CGQ and stock liquidity: Dynamic panel data estimation (H1a, 1b, 1c) 
 Trading cost  Price impact  Immediacy 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Dep. variables (t-stats) (t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats) 
 TWQS ZERO  ILLIQ AMIVEST  STO LM 
L.SLQ 0.370*** 0.769***  1.303*** 0.073  0.199** 0.804*** 
 (3.82) (5.64)  (2.88) (0.59)  (2.12) (4.08) 
Corporate governance quality         
CG index -0.069*** -0.365***  -0.064*** 0.008*  0.007*** -0.050** 
 (-2.72) (-3.37)  (-3.64) (1.69)  (4.00) (-1.98) 
Firm characteristics         
Ln (MC) -0.818*** -1.943  0.348 0.976***  0.072*** -0.286 
 (-4.30) (-1.08)  (0.63) (8.62)  (4.68) (-0.60) 
TLTA 1.611*** 4.665***  1.313** -0.049  -0.033 0.753*** 
 (6.25) (6.14)  (2.57) (-0.76)  (-1.21) (3.52) 
VOLATILITY -3.238*** -20.652***  0.922** -0.169**  0.583*** -4.735*** 
 (-11.67) (-14.61)  (2.19) (-2.40)  (16.78) (-9.09) 
TANGIBILITY -0.029 0.784  0.279 0.004  0.033 0.108 
 (-0.12) (0.87)  (1.40) (0.05)  (1.18) (0.47) 
PRICE -0.901*** -3.121***  -0.054 -0.785***  0.025* -0.611*** 
 (-7.62) (-4.13)  (-0.38) (-8.58)  (1.88) (-2.67) 
Ln (AGE) 0.176** -0.328  -0.032 0.100***  0.023*** -0.079 
 (2.30) (-0.75)  (-0.90) (4.17)  (2.67) (-0.59) 
MTB 0.105*** -0.297**  -0.145** -0.003  -0.001 0.002 
 (3.44) (-2.04)  (-2.16) (-0.46)  (-0.60) (0.07) 
Industry effect (IND) No No  No No  No No 
Year effect  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Intercept 19.372*** 59.018  -6.181 -16.277***  -1.349*** 9.146 
 (4.98) (1.54)  (-0.63) (-8.66)  (-5.08) (0.97) 
Model fits:         
Adj. R2 N/A N/A  N/A N/A  N/A N/A 
F-statistics 202.58 *** 938.8***  441.7*** 226.8***  72.71*** 528.4*** 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) -5.03*** -5.70***  -3.09*** -3.29***  -4.87*** -4.19*** 
 [0.000] [0.000]  [0.002] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) -0.77*** -1.37  1.26 -1.58  -1.33 0.17 
 [0.441] [0.170]  [0.207] [0.113]  [0.183] [0.865] 
Hansen J-statistics  3.07 0.91  0.06 20.5  107.16 1.34 
 [0.216] [0.340]  [0.810] [0.058]  [0.081] [0.247] 
N 8781 8781  8781 8781  8781 8781 
No of instruments 22 22  22 22  22 22 
No. of firms 1155 1155  1155 1155  1155 1155 
This table presents the results of dynamic two-step system GMM. The dependent variable, stock liquidity, is either time-weighted quoted spread 
(TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 3) or liquidity ratio 
(AMIVEST in Model 4) or trading turnover (STO in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Model 6). CG index is self-constructed 
index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report. See Table 1 for the definition of variables. See Table 1 for the definition of variables. We 
use robust standard errors, incorporating the Windmeijer (2005) small-sample correction. Instruments are collapsed to reduce IV proliferation and 
preserve sample depth. Finally, Arellano–Bond AR (1) and AR (2) are the test statistics for first-order and second-order serial correlation, 
respectively. Hansen J-statistics is the test of over-identifying restrictions. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
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Table 10: CGQ, disclosure and stock liquidity: Fixed effect regression 
 Panel A: CGQ and disclosure  Panel B: Disclosure and stock liquidity 
     Trading cost Price impact Immediacy 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model  3  Model 
4 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats)  (t-
stats) 
(t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dep. 
Var. 
TD PS NPS  TWQS ZERO ILLIQ LR TO LM 
(clustered 
by firm) 
(clustered 
by firm) 
(clustered 
by firm) 
 (clustered 
by firm) 
(clustered 
by firm) 
(clustered 
by firm) 
(clustered 
by firm) 
(clustered 
by firm) 
(clustered 
by firm) 
Corporate governance quality 
CG 
index 
0.011*** 0.010*** 0.012***        
 (4.91) (4.41) (5.12)        
Other 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes        
Adj. R2 0.416 0.198 0.313        
N 9143 9126 9123        
           
Level of disclosure 
TD     -1.390*** -4.999*** -0.266*** 0.354*** 0.163*** -1.099*** 
     (-10.50) (-9.96) (-5.55) (12.04) (13.62) (-9.08) 
Other 
controls 
    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2     0.408 0.486 0.480 0.485 0.211 0.386 
N     9143 9143 9143 9143 9143 9143 
           
PS     -0.847*** -2.727*** -0.134*** 0.141*** 0.102*** -0.583*** 
     (-8.50) (-6.76) (-3.63) (6.31) (11.70) (-6.32) 
Other 
controls 
    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2     0.401 0.480 0.479 0.472 0.198 0.378 
N     9126 9126 9126 9126 9126 9126 
           
NPS     -0.926*** -3.205*** -0.144*** 0.232*** 0.099*** -0.727*** 
     (-9.36) (-8.69) (-3.95) (10.18) (10.49) (-8.34) 
Other 
controls 
    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2     0.404 0.482 0.479 0.481 0.199 0.382 
N     9123 9123 9123 9123 9123 9123 
This table presents the results between CGQ and disclosure (Eq. 10) in panel A, and between disclosure and stock liquidity (Eq. 11) in panel B.  
 
𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 (𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖,𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖)
=  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  + 𝛽𝛽7𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛽𝛽8𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  + 𝛿𝛿 𝑉𝑉𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + ∅ 𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                                                     (10) 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖�𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 ,𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖, 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖�
=  𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝑍𝑍𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  
+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  + 𝛿𝛿 𝑉𝑉𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + ∅ 𝑓𝑓𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖                                                                                                                     (11) 
 
Subscripts i denotes individual firms, t time period, ln natural logarithm. The dependent variable, disclosure, in Eq. (10) is either natural logarithm of 
total documents (TD in Model 1) or price sensitive documents (PS in Model 2) or non-price sensitive documents (NPS in Model 3). The dependent 
variable, SLQ, in Eq. (11) is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 4) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in Model 5) or Amihud 
illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 6) or liquidity ratio (AMIVEST in Model 7) or trading turnover (STO in Model 8) or turnover-adjusted zero 
daily volumes (LM in Model 9). CG index is self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report. See Table 1 for the 
definition of variables. See Table 1 for the definition of variables. α, β, δ, and ∅ are the parameters to be estimated. ε is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 12: Three-stage least squares: Reverse causality 
 
Trading cost  Price impact  Immediacy 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
 (t-stats) (t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dep. variables TWQS ZERO  ILLIQ AMIVEST  STO LM 
Panel A: Stock liquidity (dependent variable) 
         
CGQ -0.055*** -0.175***  -0.654*** 0.226***  0.384*** -5.162*** 
 
(-20.98) (-14.93)  (-8.14) (4.19)  (16.12) (-18.49) 
Disclosure -0.010 -0.112***  -1.186*** 1.727***  -0.001 -0.273 
 
(1.49) (-3.75)  (-6.03) (13.43)  (-0.01) (-0.37) 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Panel B: Disclosure (dependent variable) 
CGQ 0.208*** 0.193***  0.231*** 0.178***  0.184*** 0.195*** 
 
(23.93) (22.95)  (25.57) (20.04)  (22.38) (23.35) 
Liquidity -1.826*** -0.614***  -0.032 0.194***  0.493*** -0.024*** 
 
(-4.52) (-6.61)  (-1.29) (10.15)  (9.81) 
 Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Panel C: Corporate governance (dependent variable) 
Disclosure 3.280*** 3.733***  3.315*** 3.376***  3.916*** 3.738*** 
 
(29.48) (33.69)  (28.30) (27.36)  (33.95) (33.54) 
Liquidity 11.713*** 5.701***  -0.483*** -0.600***  -3.533*** 0.208*** 
 
(5.19) (12.49)  (-6.76) (-9.47)  (-13.11) (12.29) 
Other controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
This table presents the results (using 3SLS method) between CGQ, disclosure and stock liquidity. The dependent variable in panel A is stock liquidity 
which is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure 
(ILLIQ in Model 3) or liquidity ratio (AMIVEST in Model 4) or trading turnover (STO in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in 
Model 6). The dependent variable in panel B is disclosure which is natural logarithm of total documents (i.e., TD). The dependent variable in panel C 
is corporate governance which is self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected based on one-way clustering by firm (e.g., Petersen, 2009). Superscripts ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 13: Governance categories and stock liquidity: Fixed effect regression (H2a, 2b) 
 
Trading cost 
 
Price impact 
 
Immediacy 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
 
Model 5 Model 6 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dep. variables TWQS ZERO 
 
ILLIQ AMIVEST 
 
STO LM 
 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
Panel A: Board quality 
Board quality -0.305*** -1.716*** 
 
-0.115*** 0.050** 
 
0.037*** -0.313*** 
 
(-3.40) (-4.91) 
 
(-3.57) (2.49) 
 
(4.23) (-3.96) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Intercept 47.505*** 263.392*** 
 
17.930*** -13.856*** 
 
-1.010*** 47.763*** 
 
(25.07) (35.81) 
 
(23.07) (-33.22) 
 
(-5.12) (26.66) 
Adj. R2 0.390 0.475 
 
0.475 0.462 
 
0.180 0.373 
         Panel B: Audit quality 
Audit quality -0.189*** -0.892*** 
 
-0.067*** -0.001 
 
0.007** -0.176*** 
 
(-4.10) (-5.15) 
 
(-4.38) (-0.12) 
 
(2.34) (-4.30) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Intercept 45.992*** 255.810*** 
 
17.383*** -13.783*** 
 
-0.914*** 46.309*** 
 
(24.79) (35.17) 
 
(22.20) (-32.69) 
 
(-8.21) (26.35) 
Adj. R2 0.391 0.475 
 
0.476 0.462 
 
0.066 0.374 
         Panel C: Nomination quality 
Nomination 
quality -0.061* -0.683*** 
 
-0.094*** 0.024** 
 
0.014*** -0.078** 
 
(-1.87) (-4.01) 
 
(-5.43) (2.51) 
 
(3.24) (-2.16) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Intercept 46.890*** 259.214*** 
 
17.548*** -13.726*** 
 
-0.922*** 47.100*** 
 
(43.19) (35.01) 
 
(22.75) (-32.85) 
 
(-4.66) (26.21) 
Adj. R2 0.306 0.473 
 
0.477 0.462 
 
0.178 0.371 
         Panel D: Remuneration quality 
Remuneration 
quality -0.130*** -0.720*** 
 
-0.061*** 0.002 
 
0.008 -0.126*** 
 
(-2.98) (-3.98) 
 
(-3.32) (0.18) 
 
(1.56) (-3.13) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Intercept 46.413*** 257.314*** 
 
17.463*** -13.768*** 
 
-0.916*** 46.679*** 
 
(24.54) (34.53) 
 
(22.45) (-32.52) 
 
(-4.54) (25.93) 
Adj. R2 0.389 0.474 
 
0.475 0.462 
 
0.177 0.372 
This table presents the results (using FE method) between governance categories and stock liquidity.  The dependent variable, stock liquidity, is either 
time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in 
Model 3) or liquidity ratio (AMIVEST in Model 4) or trading turnover (STO in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Model 6). 
Independent variable, governance category, is either board quality, audit quality, nomination quality or remuneration quality. Other controls are as 
mentioned in previous tables. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table 14: Individual governance variables and stock liquidity: Fixed effect regression (H2a, 
2b) 
 
Trading cost 
 
Price impact 
 
Immediacy 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
 
Model 5 Model 6 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dep. variables TWQS ZERO 
 
ILLIQ AMIVEST 
 
STO LM 
 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
Panel A: Board quality variables 
Board 
independence -0.560** -3.764*** 
 
-0.388*** 0.170*** 
 
0.116*** -0.556** 
 
(-2.47) (-4.03) 
 
(-4.49) (3.21) 
 
(4.93) (-2.54) 
CEO duality 0.252 0.994 
 
0.066 0.012 
 
-0.003 0.324 
 
(-1.01) (1.25) 
 
(0.90) (0.24) 
 
(-0.16) (1.54) 
Board meetings -0.056*** -0.236*** 
 
-0.016*** 0.009*** 
 
0.004*** -0.042*** 
 
(-5.32) (-5.57) 
 
(-4.09) (3.43) 
 
(4.12) (-4.03) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
 Adj. R2 0.393 0.477 
 
0.477 0.464 
 
0.184 0.375 
         Panel B: Audit quality variables 
AC presence -0.354** -0.297 
 
0.047 0.138*** 
 
0.035* -0.283** 
 
(-2.49) (-0.34) 
 
(0.62) (-2.79) 
 
(-1.66) (-2.24) 
AC 
independence -0.177* -1.912*** 
 
-0.246*** 0.086*** 
 
0.040*** -0.168** 
 
(-1.90) (-4.22) 
 
(-5.74) (3.54) 
 
(3.57) (-2.02) 
Adj. R2 -0.407*** -2.344*** 
 
-0.128*** 0.088*** 
 
0.029** -0.475*** 
 
(-3.91) (-4.43) 
 
(-2.70) (2.99) 
 
(2.23) (-5.12) 
AC meetings -0.259*** -1.766*** 
 
-0.115** 0.000 
 
0.035*** -0.235*** 
 
(-2.65) (-3.77) 
 
(-2.29) (0.01) 
 
(2.91) (-2.71) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.309 0.477 
 
0.477 0.463 
 
0.180 0.291 
         Panel C: Nomination quality variables 
NC presence -0.133 -1.883*** 
 
-0.205*** 0.045* 
 
0.022* -0.244** 
 
(-1.23) (-4.26) 
 
(-4.67) (1.81) 
 
(1.95) (-2.52) 
NC 
independence -0.183 -0.815 
 
-0.141*** 0.036 
 
0.038*** -0.049 
 
(-1.37) (-1.51) 
 
(-2.62) (1.19) 
 
(2.79) (-0.41) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.306 0.403 
 
0.406 0.390 
 
0.068 0.287 
         Panel D: Remuneration quality variables 
RC presence -0.401*** -1.497*** 
 
-0.061 0.046* 
 
-0.003 -0.384*** 
 
(-3.84) (-3.53) 
 
(-1.04) (-1.90) 
 
(-0.31) (-4.13) 
RC 
independence -0.071 -1.181*** 
 
-0.195*** 0.075*** 
 
0.044*** -0.049 
 
(-0.68) (-2.79) 
 
(-3.76) (3.13) 
 
(4.12) (-0.53) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.307 0.402 
 
0.475 0.390 
 
0.068 0.287 
This table presents the results for individual governance variables in each governance category. The dependent variable, stock liquidity, is either time-
weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 3) 
or liquidity ratio (AMIVEST in Model 4) or trading turnover (STO in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Model 6). Other 
controls are as mentioned in previous tables. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected based on one-way clustering by 
firm (e.g., Petersen, 2009). Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 15: Ownership concentration, CGQ and stock liquidity: Fixed effect regression 
 
Trading cost  Price impact  Immediacy 
 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dep. variables TWQS ZERO  ILLIQ AMIVEST  STO LM 
 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
 (Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
 (Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
Corporate governance quality 
CG index -0.084*** -0.478***  -0.042*** 0.010**  0.005*** -0.082*** 
 
(-4.28) (-6.18)  (-5.67) (2.22)  (2.82) (-4.69) 
OC index 0.364*** 2.136***  0.176*** -0.135***  -0.068*** 0.442*** 
 
(6.30) (9.70)  (8.44) (-10.57)  (-12.08) (8.26) 
Firm characteristics 
Ln (MC) -2.303*** -11.550***  -1.035*** 0.873***  0.053*** -2.266*** 
 
(-21.72) (-27.79)  (-24.15) (36.62)  (4.94) (-22.63) 
TLTA 1.247*** 1.755  -0.345*** -0.259***  -0.013 0.873** 
 
(3.01) (1.21)  (-2.73) (-3.22)  (-0.43) (2.37) 
VOLATILITY -1.725*** -21.785***  1.945*** -0.616***  0.537*** -5.329*** 
 
(-5.33) (-19.75)  (18.93) (-11.07)  (21.22) (-18.48) 
TANGIBILITY -0.694* -0.524  -0.316** -0.065  0.040 -0.168 
 
(-1.86) (-0.36)  (-2.11) (-0.76)  (1.07) (-0.50) 
PRICE 0.003 -0.364  0.084** -0.700***  0.053*** 0.370*** 
 
(0.03) (-0.94)  (2.27) (-30.88)  (5.16) (4.02) 
Ln (AGE) 0.076 0.264  0.089 0.073**  0.050*** 0.330* 
 
(0.43) (0.35)  (1.18) (2.32)  (2.96) (1.91) 
MTB 0.213*** 0.842***  0.070*** 0.014**  -0.005* 0.162*** 
 
(6.83) (7.31)  (6.90) (2.27)  (-1.70) (6.18) 
Industry effect 
(IND) No No 
 
No No 
 
No No 
Year effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm fixed Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Intercept 45.951*** 254.580***  17.217*** -13.544***  -0.861*** 46.188*** 
 
(24.73) (35.12)  (22.94) (-33.23)  (-4.59) (26.10) 
Model fits: 
  
 
  
 
  Adj. R2 0.397 0.487  0.485 0.436  0.204 0.385 
F-statistics 
  
 
  
 
  N 10179 10179  10179 10179  10179 10179 
No. of firms 1207 1207  1207 1207  1207 1207 
This table presents the results of firm fixed effect regression between corporate governance, ownership structure and stock liquidity. The dependent 
variable SLQ is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in Model 2) or Amihud illiquidity 
measure (ILLIQ in Model 3) or liquidity ratio (AMIVEST in Model 4) or trading turnover (STO in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes 
(LM in Model 6). CG index is self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report; OC index is based on four variables namely 
percentage of shares held by TOP20 (above median 1), block holders (above median 1), and CEO (above median 1), and the presence of one or more 
directors with substantial shareholdings. CG index is self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report. See Table 1 for 
variable definitions. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 16: CGQ and stock liquidity: Additional controls for information asymmetry 
 
Trading cost Price impact Immediacy 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
(t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) 
Dep. Var. TWQS ZERO ILLIQ LR TO LM 
 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
CG index -0.085*** -0.480*** -0.052*** 0.011** 0.009*** -0.079*** 
 
(-3.99) (-5.77) (-6.25) (2.20) (3.85) (-4.10) 
Additional controls 
BIG4 -0.516** -3.232*** -0.046 -0.035 0.002 -0.768*** 
 
(-2.48) (-4.01) (-0.59) (-0.78) (0.14) (-3.98) 
R&D -0.014 -0.054 0.012 -0.001 -0.000 -0.047 
 
(-0.40) (-0.43) (1.08) (-0.08) (-0.09) (-1.63) 
CEOSh 0.328 8.586*** 0.464** -0.404*** -0.135*** 1.489** 
 
(0.44) (3.26) (2.07) (-3.31) (-3.09) (2.49) 
Other 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 44.445*** 246.331*** 16.644*** -13.444*** -0.810*** 44.713*** 
 
(21.77) (31.86) (19.83) (-29.76) (-3.72) (23.14) 
Adj. R2 0.398 0.492 0.495 0.474 0.188 0.384 
N 8920 8920 8920 8920 8920 8920 
This table presents the results (using FE method) between CGQ and stock liquidity by including more control variables for information asymmetry. 
The dependent variable is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Model 1) or proportion of zero return days (ZERO in Model 2) or Amihud 
illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Model 3) or liquidity ratio (AMIVEST in Model 4) or trading turnover (STO in Model 5) or turnover-adjusted zero 
daily volumes (LM in Model 6). CG index is self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report. Big4 is a dummy variable 
that takes a value ‘1’ if a firm is audited by a Big 4 Audit firm and ‘0’ otherwise.  R&D is a ratio of R&D expenditure divided by annual sales. 
CEOSh is a percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares held by the CEO. Other controls are as mentioned in previous tables. Figures in parenthesis 
are the t-statistics. Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 17: CGQ, information asymmetry and stock liquidity: Split sample regression 
Panel A: Subsample analysis based on BIG4  
 
Trading cost (TWQS) Price impact (ILLIQ) Immediacy (LM) 
 
Low High Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CG index -0.089*** -0.045 -0.052*** -0.026** -0.088*** -0.053 
 
(-3.64) (-1.22) (-4.94) (-2.10) (-3.63) (-1.60) 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 35.886*** 49.843*** 19.062*** 14.332*** 35.239*** 50.280*** 
 
(12.76) (15.74) (14.40) (12.92) (12.21) (18.53) 
Adj. R2 0.348 0.415 0.481 0.488 0.292 0.436 
N 5313 3607 5313 3607 5313 3607 
Panel B: Subsample analysis based on R&D 
 
Trading cost (TWQS) Price impact (ILLIQ) Immediacy (LM) 
 
Low High Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CG index -0.093*** -0.019 -0.058*** -0.012 -0.081*** -0.048 
 
(-3.88) (-0.44) (-6.40) (-0.51) (-3.77) (-1.11) 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 45.001*** 35.605*** 16.113*** 20.369*** 45.112*** 33.496*** 
 
(20.14) (4.56) (18.00) (6.64) (21.80) (5.88) 
Adj. R2 0.402 0.351 0.511 0.380 0.392 0.306 
N 7581 1339 7581 1339 7581 1339 
Panel C: Subsample analysis based on CEOSh 
 
Trading cost (TWQS) Price impact (ILLIQ) Immediacy (LM) 
 
Low High Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CG index -0.082* -0.067 -0.052*** -0.026* -0.078** -0.051 
 
(-1.83) (-1.42) (-3.26) (-1.73) (-2.02) (-1.21) 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 46.526*** 50.449*** 15.011*** 16.840*** 45.218*** 54.332*** 
 
(11.80) (10.85) (8.42) (8.07) (10.92) (12.37) 
Observations 2231 2323 2231 2323 2231 2323 
Adj. R2 0.387 0.406 0.474 0.390 0.417 0.400 
This table presents the results (using FE method) between CGQ and stock liquidity for high and low information asymmetry firms. The dependent 
variable stock liquidity is either time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in Models 1 and 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in Models 3 and 4) or 
turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in Models 4 and 5). CG index is self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath 
report. The firms are classified into low information asymmetry (high information asymmetry group if a firm avails (does not avail) the auditing 
service from Big4 audit firm; a firm does not (does) have R&D expenditure, and a firm has low (high) CEO shareholdings. See Table 1 for the 
definition of other variables. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected based on one-way clustering by firm (e.g., 
Petersen, 2009). Superscripts ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 18: CGQ, timeliness of price discovery, and stock liquidity 
 
Panel A: CGQ and 
timeliness 
 
Panel B: Timeliness and stock liquidity 
 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
(t-stats)  (t-stats) (t-stats) (t-stats) 
 
TIMELINESS  TWQS ILLIQ LM 
 
(Clustered by firm) 
 (Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
(Clustered by 
firm) 
CG index -0.003***  
   
 
(-3.87)  
   TIMELINESS 
 
 1.804*** 1.666*** 0.339* 
  
 (10.67) (11.03) (1.66) 
Additional 
controls Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.760***  26.136*** 0.703*** 2.691*** 
 
(20.60)  (56.05) (5.27) (14.87) 
Adj. R2 0.133  0.514 0.457 0.154 
N 5463  5463 5463 5463 
This table presents the results (using FE method) between CGQ and timeliness in panel A and between timeliness and stock liquidity in panel B. The 
dependent variable in panel A is timeliness of price discovery (TIMELINESS in model 1). The dependent variable in panel B stock liquidity is either 
time-weighted quoted spread (TWQS in model 2) or Amihud illiquidity measure (ILLIQ in model 3) or turnover-adjusted zero daily volumes (LM in 
model 4). CG index is self-constructed index based on 17 objective criteria of the Horwath report. See Table 1 for the definition of other variables. 
Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Standard errors are corrected based on one-way clustering by firm (e.g., Petersen, 2009). Superscripts ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
